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From the Constitutionality of Juvenile Curfew Ordinances to a Children's
Agenda for the 1990s: Is It Really a Simple Matter of Supporting Family
Values and Recognizing Fundamental Rights?
Abstract
The analysis of the constitutionality of curfew ordinances provides a window into a process that obfuscates
rather than clarifies the nature of the constitutional problem. By defining the issue as one governed by rights,
we limit our ability to comprehend the larger issue of how the Supreme Court has defined the relationship
between minors, the family and society. The issue of the rights of minors as they relate to curfew ordinances
offers a measure of solace by reducing the number of disturbing questions which concern cultural change and
public policy decisions relating to the family. An understanding of this process requires that the legal issue, as
to the constitutionality of juvenile curfews defined by the courts, be more fully understood. To that end, Part I
will examine those decisions and their results. Part II will follow with an examination of the Supreme Court's
vision of the American Family. Part III examines the extent to which the attempt to define the issue solely as
one of constitutional rights represents a natural extension of the Court's view of the family and the Court's
acceptance of the political and cultural assumptions underlying the establishment of the juvenile court system.
These assumptions are particularly manifest in the Supreme Court's opinion in In re Gault. Throughout this
section, the Court's view of the rights of minors and the importance of the family is juxtaposed with selected
views of the Commission to demonstrate that, notwithstanding the radically different origins of the two
bodies, the respective conclusions are remarkably similar. Finally, there are, hopefully, some lessons to be
learned from this excursion into the realm of juvenile curfews.
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FROM THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
JUVENILE CURFEW ORDINANCES TO A 
CIDLDREN'S AGENDA FOR THE 1990s: IS IT 
REALLY A SIMPLE MA'I*I'ER OF SUPPORTING 
FAMILY VALUES AND RECOGNIZING 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS? 
MICHAEL J ORDAN° 
INTRODUCflON 
In November of 1990, Atlanta, Georgia enacted a teen curfew 
ordinance in response to a series of late-night, drug-related killings of 
25 youngsters.1 A spokeswoman for the Atlanta Police Department 
characterized the ordinance as an attempt to enforce parental responsi-
bility by allowing the police to bring criminal charges against the par-
ents of curfew violators. Parents of violators could face up to 60 days 
in jail and $1,000 in fines.2 The sponsor of the ordinance emphasized 
• Associate Professor, William Mitchell College of Law; J.D., University of Iowa College of Law, 
1980; B.A., Bowdin College, 1975. 
1. Joyce Price, Curfew Laws Sweep Kids Off Streets, But Police Wonder "Does It 
Work?", WASH. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1990, at A1. 
2. Id. The Atlanta juvenile curfew ordinance provides in pertinent part: 
It is unlawful for any minor 16 years of age or younger to loiter, wander, 
stroll or play in or upon the public streets, highways, roads, alleys, parks, play-
grounds or other public grounds, public places, public buildings, places of amusement, 
eating places, vacant lots or any place unsupervised by an adult having the lawful 
authority to be at such places, between the hours of 11 p.m. on any day and 6 a.m. 
of the following day; provided, however, that on Fridays and Saturdays the effective 
hours are between 12 midnight and 6 a.m. of the following day: and provided, that 
the provisions of this section shall not apply in the following instances: (a) When a 
minor is accompanied by his or her parent, or guardian or other adult person having 
the lawful care and custody of the minor: (b) When the minor is upon an emergency 
errand directed by his or her parent or guardian or other adult person having the 
lawful care or custody of such minor; (c) When the minor is returning directly home 
from a school activity, entertainment, recreational activity or dance: (d) When the 
minor is returning directly home from lawful employment that makes it necessary to 
be in the above referenced places during the proscribed period of time: (e) When the 
minor is attending or travelling directly to or from an activity involving the exercise 
of iU'St amendment rights of free speech, freedom of assembly or free exercise of 
religion: (t) When the minor is in a motor vehicle with parental consent for travel, 
with interstate travel through the City of Atlanta, excepted in all cases from the 
curfew. 
ATIANTA, GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 7, § 17-0002 (1990). 
389 
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its protective rather than punitive nature: "Our children face a myriad 
of problems, and this is just one attempt, one tool to help them . . . . 
A lot of parents have responded positively to the law, but the kids 
have complained that they are being targeted. We want them to un-
derstand that these limits are designed to protect and not to harass 
them."3 All, however, were not as sanguine about the ameliorative 
effects of the curfew. Atlanta's Police Chief, while supporting the ordi-
nance, viewed it as a stop-gap measure. The ordinance was necessary 
until social service agencies could intervene and encourage parents to 
voluntarily get involved in controlling their children. In his view, city 
officials were compelled to act, given the urgency of the problem.4 
One senses from these comments a belief in the community that 
either Atlanta or its children, perhaps both, were under a state of siege. 
But, were Atlanta's teenagers being victimized by drug dealers on the 
streets? Or, were these youngsters simply the unfortunate victims of 
parental neglect? The former suggests the need for crime control and 
prevention; the latter points to the need for punitive sanctions against 
parents who fail to meet their responsibilities.s Is Atlanta's response 
simply an isolated example? Can we simply dismiss it as one city's 
response or overreaction to its problems? 
Consider the response of the Washington, D.C. City Council to 
what was perceived as an epidemic of illicit drug sales and use on the 
streets of Washington. The Council passed a curfew aimed at protecting 
minors by reducing the likelihood that they would be victims or perpe-
trators of drug-related crimes. It was also viewed as an aid to parents 
in meeting their responsibility to exercise reasonable supervision over 
children entrusted to their care.6 Again, one is struck by the degree to 
which it is difficult to ascertain who is victim and who is perpetrator. 
If the attempt to "assist" parents in exercising their parental responsibil-
3. Ronald Smothers, Atlanta Sets a Curfew for Youths, Prompting Concern on Race Bias, 
N.Y. TIMBS, Nov. 20, 1990, at Al. 
4. !d. 
5. Davetta Johnson, a member of the Atlanta City Council, believed the problem repre-
sented, in part, a failure of parental responsibility. While acknowledging homelessness, hunger, 
illiteracy and unemployment as significant causes of social unrest, she also believed there 
problems had no immediate solution. See Davetta C. Johnson, Curfew Laws Protect our Chil-
dren, USA TODAY, Nov. 27, 1990, at lOA. This harsh reality led her to conclude that the 
curfew protects children "and places the primary responsibility for keeping them out of harm's 
way with the parents." !d. For Ms. Johnson, the issue became a simple question with a self-
evident answer: "Can and should a parent be held responsible for their children's actions? I 
respond by asking, if not the parent, then who in our society is responsible for our children?" 
!d. 
6. See Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125, 1127 (O.D.C. 1989). 
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ity is successful, will the drug epidemic be reduced? If it is reduced, 
this sugg~ts that minors are, if not the primary cause of the drug 
problem, at least a palpable one. Or is it the other way around? Minors 
are not necessarily a major cause of the drug epidemic. Yet, the failure 
of parents to exert parental authority may invariably lead to the victim-
ization of children by those causing the epidemic. 
Lest one believes that the current spate of curfews imposed upon 
minors is limited to large, densely populated, urban environments, con-
sider the plight of David Simmons. David, a 15 year-old minor, was 
caught skateboarding with a friend at 10:35 p.m. in Panora, Iowa. Not 
only was David prohibited by local ordinance from being abroad at that 
hour, the ordinance charged David's parents with the responsibility of 
enforcing this prohibition.7 The City passed the ordinance in the inter-
est of protecting minors from the national epidemic of drugs, and par-
ents were designated the primary agents for the enforcement of the 
ordinance.8 
There are other indications that the concerns of these cities are 
neither isolated pockets of anxiety over drugs, nor limited to particular 
regions of the country. In this regard, it is helpful to consider some of 
Qle findings articulated by the National Commission On Children (the 
"Commission").9 These findings suggest that drugs and curfew ordi-
nances are merely symptomatic of deeper problems affecting American 
families. America is undergoing a fundamental change in the compo-
sition of its population, suggesting that problems concerning youth 
should, over time, diminish. The proportion of young people in the 
population is decreasing while there is a corresponding increase in the 
percentage of older people.10 Unfortunately, the composition of the 
younger population is also changing. A higher percentage of minority 
children are found in this group, and these children are least likely to 
succeed in America.ll These simple observations might lead one to 
conclude that curfew ordinances, particularly those enacte!i in larger 
cities, are directed at this ever increasing percentage of minority chil-
dren. This view was partially articulated by one commentator on the 
Atlanta Curfew Ordinance whep he observed that "adults periodically 
develop a sense that kids are out of, control, and then tum to measures 
7. See City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Iowa 1989). 
8. !d. at 370. 
9. NAll0NAL COMM'N ON CHIlDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC A NEW AMERICAN AGENDA 
FOR CHIlDREN AND FAMIUES (1991) [hereinafter NAll0NAL COMM'N, BEYOND RHETORIC]. 
10. !d. at 16. 
11. !d. at 16-17. 
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like curfews."12 This general concern about children was narrowed to 
target what has been described as the "plight of black men and black 
chiidren."13 The curfew could be vi€?wed as an explicit attempt to im-
pose some form of social control over the group that is least likely to 
succeed in America.14 
But, what about David Simmons in Panora, Iowa? Were the same 
forces that presumably instigated the movement to pass the curfew 
ordinance in Atlanta also operative in Panora? Is Panora attempting to 
ameliorate the plight of black children? Perhaps Panora has a problem 
with its children, though not minority children. IS Consider some of the 
additional observations made by the Commission on the difficulties 
faced by all children in America, though some experience them more 
acutely than others. An ever increasing number of children must care 
for themselves while their parents work. This fact is not lost on par-
ents. According to a national survey conducted by the Commission, 
only 39% of parents believe they were spending the right amount of 
time with their children. Thirty percent believe they need a lot more 
time with their families, and, 29% believe they require a little more 
time.16 In addition, the Commission noted the existence of high risk 
behavior engaged in by one in four adolescents which may result in 
harmful long-term consequencesP 
The Commission did not simply limit itself to delineating the 
nature of the problem. Although not purporting to present a total solu-
tion to the issues raised by the report, the Commission believed that 
any solution must start with meeting the needs of children through the 
creation and support of stable families. By viewing the family as the 
core element that any solution must contain, the Commission adopted a 
well-recognized and accepted position on the relationship between 
society'S ills, children and the role of the family in solving social prob-
lems.IS Even Vice President Quayle articulated the same sentiments 
12. See Smothers, Supra note 3. 
13. /d. 
14. ld. 
15. The City of Panora, Iowa has a total population of 1,100. The minority popUlation of 
the City is two (Native American) and the remaining 1,098 are white. BUREAU OF 1llB CENSUS, 
1990 CENSUS OF POPUlATION AND Hous. SUMM. OF POPUlATION AND Hous. CHARAcrBRlS-
TICS, IOWA (1990). . 
16. NATIONAL COMM'N, BEYOND RHBlURIC, supra note 9, at 27-28. 
17. Examples of high risk behavior include: committing acts of juvenile delinquency; drug 
and alcohol use; and early and unprotected sexual activity. /d. at 52-54. 
18. /d. at 62. The Commission's report was not the first time that a national commission 
articulated a relationship between social ills and the family. In 1967, the President's Commis-
sion on Law Enforcement :p1d Administration of Justice reached a similar conclusion concerning 
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when he pointed to an episode of Murphy Brown, a popular television 
series, as symptomatic of what is wrong with America. A combination 
of a breakdown in family structure and personal responsibility has lead 
to social anarchy and anti-family values such as those championed on 
Murphy Brown.19 
Panora's problem is, therefore, America's problem, so to speak. 
The recent surge in the number of cities looking to implement or vig-
orously enforce existing curfews may be a response to a deeper feeling 
of desperation over what is happening to children and families in 
the significance of the family in coping with the problem of juvenile delinquency: 
The family is the fust and most basic institution in our society for developing 
the child's potentia~ in all its many aspects: emotiona~ intellectual, mora~ and spiri-
tual, as well as physical and social. Other influences do not even enter the child's 
life until after the first few formative years. It is within the family that the child 
must learn to curb his desires and to accept rules that define the time, place, and 
circumstances under which highly personal needs may be satisfied in socially accept-
able ways. This early training - management of emotions, confrontation with rules 
and authority, development of responsiveness to others - has been repeatedly related 
to the presence or absence of delinquency in later years • • • • 
Research findings • • • point to the principle that whatever in the organization 
of the family, the contacts among its members, or its relationship to the surrounding 
community diminishes the moral and emotional authority of the family in the life of 
the young person also increases the likelihood of delinquency. 
THB PRESIDBNT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMBNT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCB RE-
PORT, JUVIlNILB DEUNQUBNCY AND Yourn CRIMB 45 (1967). 
These observations are similar to those offered by yet another presidential commission 
which studied mental health. One of the task panels of the Commission observed that all of its 
recommendations were based upon principles reflective of certain values. Some of these values 
are: 
The viability and primacy of families, regardless of specific structure, -as the 
basic units of our society and a major mental health resource, and the need to re-
spect family forms in all of their diversity. . 
The desirability of government policies that strengthen families and maintain 
family intactness as a primary goa~ that encourage natural supports for families to 
the fullest possible extent before going on to intrusive interventions. 
The importance of giving parents appropriate influence in decision making about their 
children and in the policies and operating programs of social institutions that support, 
supplement, or substitute for families. 
TASK PANEL REPoRTS, APPENDIX TO 1lfB REPORT TO 1lfB PRESIDBNT FROM 1lfB PRESIDENT'S 
COMM'N ON MENTAL HBAL1lf 567 (1978). 
It is readily apparent that even though the Commission on Children was to lay the foun-
dation for a new agenda on children and families, it was merely reiterating previously articulat-
ed views on values and the role of the family in America. 
19. Vice President Quayle believed that America was experiencing a poverty of values, 
threatening the very foundation upon which the American family was built and leading to social 
anarchy. Murphy Brown was cited as an example of a decline in moral values. The 
protagonist's decision to bear a child out of wedlock was seen as irresponsible behavior that 
ridiculed the importance of fatherhood. Vice President Quayle went even further and drew a 
connection between the civil unrest in Los Angeles and the disintegration of family values and 
structure which Murphy Brown and television programming either caused or exacerbated. See 
Michael Wines, Views on Single Motherhood are Multiple at White House, N.Y. TIMES, May 
21, 1992, at Al. 
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America. The public's reaction to Atlanta's ordinance suggests that the 
ordinance represents more than a legal response to a particular issue. 
Rather, it is more akin to a political response to a cultural phenomenon 
- the loss of control by families over children and the plight of black 
youth. A curfew passed in this context may be more indicative of our 
anxieties rather than a reasoned response to a known and well-defined 
threat. A sensitive spot in the' collective psyche of the community may 
have been touched by our perception of the changes occurring in 
American families and the curfew. If the ordinance does bear this direct 
relationship between anxieties and a response to them, one might ex-
pect these ordinances to meet with a wide degree of acceptance by the 
courts when their legitimacy is challenged. 
However, recent decisions by the courts on the legality of curfew 
ordinances for minors have not consistently endorsed them. Courts have 
focused on the extent to which the ordinance trammels a minor's exer-
cise of her constitutional rights.20 While the specific right alleged to 
have been violated may vary, the issue is the same: the extent to which 
the behavior of minors and adults are subject to different degrees of 
control by the state.21 The "rights"· of minors appear to be on a col-
lision course with the anxiety of adults. This problem has not escaped 
the view of commentators. The issue is generally phrased as the extent 
to which the constitutional rights of minors are coextensive with those 
of adults, and where they are not, on what basis may a principled 
distinction be drawn.22 
The constitutional validity of juvenile curfew ordinances raises the 
question of the extent to which social/cultural problems are formulated 
in ways that render them capable or incapable of legal solutions. 
Whether one looks to Panora, Atlanta or Washington, D.C., the curfew 
20. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981); People ex rei. 
J.M., 768 P.2d 219 (Colo. 1989); City of Milwaukee v. K.F., 426 N.W.2d 329 (Wis. 1988). 
21. See, e.g., Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989) (rmding that a minor's 
First Amendment rights of expression and association were entitled to the same degree of 
protection as an adult's rights). 
22. Paul M. Cahill, Assessing The Scope of Minors' Fum/amental Rights: Juvenile Curfews 
and the Constitution, 97 HARv. L REv. 1163 (1984); Susan M. Horowitz, A Search for 
Constitutional Slandartls: Judicial Review of Juvenile Curfew Ordinances, '24 COWM. J.L & 
Soc. PROBS. 381 (1991);. Note, Assessing the Constitutional Validity of Juvenile Curfew Ordi-
nances, 52 NOtRE DAMB L. REv. 858 (1977); Note, Curfew Ordinances and the Control of 
Nocturnal Juvenile Crime, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 66 (1958) [hereinafter Note, Curfew Ordinanc-
es]; Note, Juvenile Curfew Ordinances and the Constitution, 76MICH L. REv. 109 (1977); 
Note, The Juvenile Curfew Ordinance: In Search of a New Slandard of Review, 41 WASH. U. 
J. URB. & CONTBMP. L. 163 (1992); Note, Nonemergency Municipal Curfew Ordinances and 
the Liberty Interest of Minors, 12 FORDHAM URB. U. 513 (1984). 
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grew out of a community's perception that a law was needed to impose 
some type of control over the behavior of minors. And, quite signifi-
cantly, parents must bear some responsibility; either because they have 
failed to prevent the behavior prior to intervention by the state, or they 
are charged with some responsibility in enforcing the curfew. This 
charge to parents and limitation placed upon the behavior of minors 
occurs against a constitutional backdrop that places limitations upon the 
extent minors may, in fact, be constrained in their behavior, and their 
parents told how to manage the affairs of the family. 
Typically, the commentators who have examined the issues sur-
rounding the legality of curfew ordinances have limited their analysis to 
ascertaining whether minors have rights that are coextensive with those 
of adults.23 This will not be the focus of this Article. This Article is 
not an attempt to explicate previously undiscovered or ill-defined rights. 
Quite frankly, this Article is concerned with the unsettling feelings one 
cannot help but experience given the almost daily reports in the news-
papers of violence committed by or against children. One's immediate 
intuitive response is to question whether a curfew ordinancy could stem 
the tide of woe which children are experiencing. At a very basic level, 
imposing a curfew requirement upon minors and holding parents re-
sponsible for a violation presupposes that there are parents who are 
present to be held responsible. The rise of the "zero parent families"24 
calls into question the applicability of these ordinances to minors who 
are perhaps most vulnerable to the evils the ordinance is supposed to 
eliminate. Somehow the issue of rights - whether children have a 
constitutional right commensurate with that of adults to be upon the 
streets at night - appears all too distant from offering any solution to 
the pervasive and imminent problems we face. 
This less than cerebral response to a legal question does have 
some value. Our relationship with children and the institutions in which 
they are raised (families) are part of our culture. Since one function of 
culture is to make our world more intelligible to uS,2S any challenge 
to or change in such a significant institution is likely to emit emotional 
23. See supra note 22. 
24. The term "zero parent families" refers to the living arrangements of children who are 
not with either their mother or father. High concentrations of these children are occurring with 
increasing frequency within many urban, inner-city areas. It is estimated that in 1990 nearly 
10% of American children lived in households headed by someone other than a parent. This 
figure is up from 6.7% in 1970. See Jane Gross, Col/apse of Inner-City Families Creates 
America's New Orphans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1992, at 1. 
25. See PHn.JP RIEfF, THE TRIUMPH OF TIlE THERAPEUIlC: USES OF FAITIf AFrER FREUD 
232 (1966). 
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shock waves experienced both at an individual and community level. 
Curfew ordinances and the evil they are intended to eliminate or con-
trol may be a manifestation of cultural seismic activity. This is because 
"culture sUlVives principally . . . by the power of its institutions to 
·bind and loose men in the conduct of their affairs with reasons which 
. sink so deep into the self that they become commonly and implicitly 
understood . . . ." 26 If our understanding of children and the institu-
tions that shape them is changing, implicit understanding is reduced and 
the search for new meaning and control begins. The analysis of the 
constitutionality of curfew ordinances provides a window into a process 
that obfuscates rather than clarifies the nature of the problem. By defin-
ing the issue as one governed by rights, we limit our ability to com-
prehend the larger issue of how the Supreme Court has defined the 
relationship between minors, the family and society. The issue of the 
righ.ts of minors as they relate to curfew ordinances offers a measure of 
solace by reducing the number of disturbing questions which concern 
cultural change and public policy decisions relating to the family. 
An understanding of this process requires that the legal issue, as 
to the constitutionality of juvenile curfews a~. defined by the courts, be 
more fully understood. To that end, Part I will examine those decisions 
and their results. Part IT will follow with an examination of the Su-
preme Court's vision of the American Family.27 Part ITI examines the 
extent to which the attempt to define the issue solely as one of consti-
tutional rights represents a natural extension of the Court's view of the 
family and the Court's acceptance of the political and cultural assump-
tions underlying the establishment of the juvenile court system. These 
assumptions are particularly manifest in the Supreme Court's opinion in 
In re Gault.'l8 Throughout this section, the Court's view of the rights 
of minors and the importance of the family is juxtaposed with selected 
views of the Commission to demonstrate that, notwithstanding the radi-
cally different origins of the two bodies, the respective conclusions are 
26. !d. at 2. 
27. The Supreme Court has not addressed the question of whe'ther municipalities may, con-
sistent with the Constitution, impose a curfew ordinance on minors that would be unconstitu-
tional if imposed upon adults. However, the Court was presented with the opportunity to do so 
in Bykofsky v. Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (MD. Pa. 1975), affd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir. 
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.s. 964 (1976). Bykofsky involved a challenge to a juvenile curfew 
ordinance which made it unlawful for minors to be on the streets during certain hours. The 
ordinance was upheld by the lower court. Certiorari was denied and Justice Marshall dissented 
from the denial. He believed the case presented a constitutional issue which the Court should 
address, i.e., the extent to which the due process rights of minors are entitled to less protection 
than those of adults. 429 U.s. at 965. 
28. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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remarkably similar." Finally, there are, hopefully, some lessons to be 
learned from this excursion into the realm of juvenile curfews. 
I. THE EVOLVING VIEW OF JUVENILE CURFEW STATUTES 
A. THE RISE AND FALL OF TIlE PRESENCE/LolTERING DISllNCllON 
Juvenile curfew ordinances are not new.29 What is different about 
the recent emphasis upon them is the type of legal challenge mounted 
against them. Early decisions either affirming or denying the legitimacy 
of a curfew ordinance turned on such distinctions as whether the 
ordinance prohibited minors from being present on the streets or in 
public places, as opposed to 10itering.30 The constitutionality of the 
ordinance hinged upon whether it prohibited minors from being present 
at a particular location during the hours of the curfew, or whether the 
ordinance proscribed juveniles from remaining at a particular 
location.31 It was impermissible to proscribe the presence of a juvenile 
in public places during certain hours. If, however, presence changed 
into remaining at a particular location for an extended period of time, 
that conduct could be proscrlbed.32 
It is readily apparent how the practical answer to the constitutional 
question depended upon how ambulatory the juvenile was or at what 
point the officer enforcing the statute encountered the juvenile. In prac-
tice, the enforcement of these two types of ordinances created a distinc-
tion with little difference.33 Indeed, it is very difficult to see how any 
meaningful distinction could be made. Regardless of whether the juve-
nile was present in a public place or remained there, neither activity is 
inherently suspicious and obviously are not criminal. The activity is 
proscribed because of the actor's identity, as opposed to the nature of 
29. For a brief history of the origin of curfew ordinances generally and juvenile curfew 
ordinances in particular, see Note, Curfew Ordinance, supra note 22, at 67 n5. 
30. See, e.g., Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate For Ocean City, 204 A.2d 688 (Md. App. 
1964)i People v. Walton, 161 P.2d 498 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. a. 1945). 
31. See, e.g., Thistlewood, 204 A.2d at 692. 
32. The key to the distinction lies in the definition of "remains." In People v. Walton, 161 
P.2d 498 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1945), the court adopted the dictionary defmition of 
remains. Thus, to remain means "[t]o stay behind while others withdrawi" "to tarryi" "to stay." 
Jd. at 501. From this definition the court concluded that the ordinance was aimed at preventing 
minors from staying unnecessarily upon the streets. However, it does not restrict minors from 
using the streets while in the process of going to or from business or amusement. /d. This 
definition narrows the focus of inquiry to answering the question of to what extent the minor is 
using the street or other public place as the focus of her activity or is using it as a means of 
achieving some other end, i.e., as a means of conveyance to some other location or activity. 
33. See Note, Curfew Ordinances, supra note 22, at 73. 
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the conduct. A juvenile who loiters is believed to be more prone to 
engage in illegal activity.34 
Even this assumption, no matter how intuitive its appeal, cannot 
withstand sustained scrutiny. Mere presence upon the streets during the 
proscribed hours may equally indicate a juvenile who is neither prone 
to participate in illegal activity nor is preparing to engage in criminal 
conduct. Given the fact that the identity of the actor and not her overt 
behavior renders the conduct suspicious, it is easy to see why a doc-
trine based upon the presence/loitering distinction was likely to collapse 
under the weight of police enforcement. One officer's identification of 
loitering could be another's definition of presence. In both instances, no 
criminal or attempted criminal activity is observed. Thus, this initial 
attempt to define the constitutionality of juvenile curfew statutes rested 
upon a distinction between types of conduct that in reality may not 
have existed, and if they did, were often too subtle to discern by police 
officers charged with enforcing the ordinance.3s 
It was not until the mid-1970s that the courts abandoned the pres-
ence/loitering distinction. The focus shifted to whether the ordinance 
infringed upon the liberty interests of juveniles. This approach resulted 
from two factors. The Supreme Court began to specify the areas of a 
minor's life which could not be subject to intrusive state regulation. In 
addition, the Court delineated procedural protections which must be 
extended to minors even when the State could lawfully subject a minor 
to state control.36 
34. Curfew ordinance violations, regardless of the penalty imposed, are therefore status of-
fenses. Liability is based upon the identity of the offender. If an adult was engaged in the 
same behavior there would be no violation. See S. Korbrin et a!., Offense Patterns of Status 
Offenders, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN JtNENllll DELINQUENCY 203 (D. Shichor & D. Kelly, eds. 
1980). The remaining/presence distinction makes more sense when one understands the assump-
tions underlying status offenses. Special beliefs and expectations are associated with childhood. 
Childhood is therefore more than a particular biological stage in life. It represents a social 
status that has meaning only within a particular social context and in relation to other statuses. 
See LAMAR T. EMPEY, AMERICAN DELINQUENCY, ITS MEANING AND CONSfRUCTION 5 (1 CJ78). 
Juvenile curfews presuppose that children using the street for any other purpose than as a 
means of conveyance are likely to get into trouble. Whether or not this is empirically demon-
strable is less important than the social beliefs and expectations concerning appropriate behavior 
for minors. It is more a reflection of a particular view of childhood rather than a device formu-
lated from rational, empirically tested hypotheses. /d. at 5. 
35. See Note, Curfew Ordinances, supra note 22, at 73, 96-CJ7, 99. 
36. See g~ally Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 623 (1CJ78) (holding that a state requirement 
of parental consent in every instance involving a request by an unmarried minor to have an 
abortion performed on her is unconstitutional); Carey v. Population Servo Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 
(1 CJ77) (state law banning the sale of nonprescription contraceptives to minors held unconstitu-
tional); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.s. 519 (1CJ7S) (Double Jeopardy Clause bars subsequent prosecu-
tion for crime that served as the basis for adjudicating a minor delinquent); Goss V. Lopez, 419 
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Waters v. BarrY7 illustrates the current approach employed by 
courts in assessing the constitutionality of juvenile curfew ordinances. 
In Waters, the City Council of Washington, D.C. passed an ordinance 
designed to provide for the welfare of minors by reducing the 
likelihood that they would be the victims or perpetrators of criminal 
acts. It was also believed that the ordinance would assist parents in 
fulfilling their obligation to exercise reasonable supervision over their 
children.38 An 11:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. curfew was imposed which 
prohibited minors from remaining in certain public places and made it 
unlawful for parents to allow their children to violate the curfew.39 
u.s. 56S (1975) (public school is constitutionally required to provide notice and hearing before 
a minor may be suspended from school); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (the standard of 
proof, beyond reasonable doubt, applies ,to juvenile delinquency adjudications); Tinker v. Des 
Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (students entitled to First Amendment protection of 
"pure speech" at school); In Re Gault, 387 U.s. 1 (1967) (establishing that Due Process re-
quires certain procedural protection be afforded to minors during the adjudication stage of the 
juvenile justice process where commitment to a state institution may follow). 
37. 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989). 
38. Id. at 1127. 
39. The ordinance listed its purposes as: "(I) [r]educing the likelihood that minors will be 
the victims of criminal acts during the curfew hours; (2) [r ]educing the likelihood that minors 
will become involved in criminal acts or exposed to drug trafficking during the curfew hours; 
and (3) [a]iding parents in carrying out their responsibility to exercise reasonable supervision of 
the minors entrusted to their care." !d. at '1141. The curfew was limited to persons under the 
age of 18 and was in effect between the hours of 11:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. each day except 
Friday and Saturday evenings when the curfew commenced at 11:59 p.m. 
It was unlawful for any minor to "remain in or upon any street, sidewalk, park or other 
outdoor public place in the District during the curfew hours." !d. It was unlawful for a parent 
not "knowingly to permit or, by negligent failure to exercise reasonable control, allow his or 
her minor child to remain on any street, sidewalk, park or other outdoor public place within the 
District during the curfew hours." !d. 
Finally, certain enumerated exceptions were allowed. The curfew did not apply to: "(1) 
[w]hen a minor is accompanied by a parent; (2) [w]hen a minor is returning home by way of 
a direct route from an activity that is sponsored by an educational, religious, or non-profit 
organization within 60 minutes of the termination of the activity, if the activity has been 
registered with the Mayor in advance; (3) [w]hen a minor is traveling in a motor vehicle; (4) 
[w]hen a minor is ,acting within· the scope of legitimate employment ..•. " !d. There was also 
an exception which allowed (or travel if necessary to accomplish certain additional purposes 
delineated in the ordinance. !d. 
Even though the ordinance used the term "remain," it did not play any role in the 
assessment of the constitutionality of the statute. Apparently, the Court either rejected or saw no 
relevance in the presence/remaining distinction previously employed by courts in their constitu-
tional analysis of curfew ordinances. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text. Moreover, 
by ignoring the presence/remaining distinction and focusing upon the rights of minors, the 
ordinance could no longer be justified as simply a status offense. That is, the ordinance could 
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The district court held that the ordinance was an unconstitutional 
infringement of the First Amendment rights of expression and associa-
tion, as well as a violation of a Fifth Amendment fundamental liberty 
interest. The court cited Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville4fl as au-
thority for the position that the Constitution recognized a liberty interest 
in using public streets for presumably no other reason than to simply 
enjoy wandering about town. A clear restriction was placed upon the 
nocturnal activity of juveniles and Papachristou demonstrated that the 
same type of activity, when engaged in by adults, was constitutionally 
protected activity that could not be regulated in the manner attempted 
by the City Council. After the Waters Court identified the right in-
volved, the question became whether a minor's liberty interest in noc-
turnal activity should receive less protection than that of an adult. To 
answer this question, the Court adopted the three factor test used in 
Bellotti v. Baird.41 Notwithstanding the different factual context in 
which Bellotti arose, the Waters Court found the test appropriate for 
determining when a state may be less deferential to the rights of mi-
nors and may subject their conduct to a higher degree of regulation. 
The first BeJlotti factor, which requires inquiry into the peculiar 
vulnerability of minors, provided insufficient justification for the ordi-
nance. Juveniles were not exposed to any danger peculiar to them. 
Drugs and the violence afflicting the streets of Washington, D.C. posed 
not be justified on the basis of it being a codiflC3tion of assumptions concerning childhood and 
the way minors behave. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. The search was now for 
some rationally and empirically based justification for the ordinance. 
40. 405 U.S. 156 (1972). 
41. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). Bellotti involved a Massachusetts statute which required parental 
consent before an abortion could be performed on an unmarried woman under the age of 18. If 
one or both parents refused consent, the abortion could be obtained by order of a Superior 
Court Judge "for good cause shown." The state court construed the statute as requiring consent 
for every nonemergency abortion unless a parent was unavailable to give consent. If a parent 
was available he/she must be given notice of any judicial proceeding brought by a minor to 
obtain consent for an abortion. Even if the minor were found capable of making and made an 
informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion, the court could withhold its consent on a 
finding that a parent's or the court's own contrary decision is a better one. 
The statute waS found to be unconstitutional. Justice Powell acknowledged in his plurali-
ty opinion that children are not beyond the protection of the Constitution, but the rights of 
children have never been equated with those of adults. The status of minors under the law is 
unique and constitutional principles must be applied to them with "sensitivity and flexibility." 
!d. at 633-34. Instead of following any rigid formula for determining when the constitutional 
rights of minors are the same as adults', the Court relied upon three factors in assessing 
whether the constitutional rights of minors must be accorded the same protection as those of 
adults: "the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an 
informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing." !d. at 634. 
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a threat to everyone; adults as well as juveniles.42 The ordinance did 
not fare any better under the second Bellotti factor. A juvenile's deci-
sion not to remain in her home during the curfew hours was not a 
decision so difficult as to be beyond the ability of a minor to make 
without intervention by the District. Leaving one's home during curfew 
hours does not inevitably lead to such hannful consequences as to 
justify the District's decision to intervene in that decision-making pro-
cess and limit the discretion of the juvenile.43 The final factor, the 
importance of the parental role in raising children, was equally unper-
suasive. While conceding the accuracy of the District's assumption that 
parental control over children's activities has diminished due to the 
dissolution of the traditional family unit, the Court found the District's 
response unwarranted. The problem was that "this assumption ignores 
the many thousands of the District's families for whom the ideal of 
family unity and parental control still lives."44 Ironically, the assump-
tion exacerbated rather than ameliorated the problem. However true the 
assumption may be in some if not many instances, it undermined pa-
rental authority by arrogating to the District the decision-maldng author-
ity normally reserved for parents.4S 
The ordinance was also vulnerable to an equal protection chal-
lenge under the Fifth Amendment. The ordinance distinguished between 
juveniles and nonjuveniles, subjecting the conduct of juveniles to a 
greater degree of state control. Here again the district court encountered 
the question whether the classification and restrictions trammelled a 
fundamental right protected ·by the Constitution.46 Since the ordinance 
burdened the exercise of the First Amendment right of association and 
a Fifth Amendment fundamental liberty interest, the constitutionality of 
the ordinance had to be reviewed under the more demanding strict 
scrutiny standard. Only a compelling state interest could justify the 
classification scheme and the classification chosen had to bear an inti-
mate relationship to the problem the District sought to alleviate.47 
Even though the district court found that the purpose of the ordi-
nance was to advance a compelling state interest, there was no logical 
relationship between the classification chosen and the compelling inter-
est. The purposes of the ordinance - protection of juveniles from 
42. Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1137. 
43. !d. 
44. Id. 
45. !d. 
46. !d. at 1137-38. 
47. !d. at 1139. 
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harm, insulation from the evils of the street, and reduction of street 
violence - were not advanced by the juvenile/nonjuvenile classifica-
tion.48 For the Waters Court, it was sheer naivete to assume that those 
youths who would leave their homes at night to engage in the sale or 
use of drugs, or street violence, would be deterred from doing so by 
the existence of a curfew ordinance. Street violence - homicide - is 
illegal and presumably a juvenile who was undeterred by the existing 
criminal sanctions would not be deterred by the less severe sanctions 
imposed by the curfew.49 Only those juveniles already inclined to 
obey the law would be predisposed to foIlow the command of the 
ordinance. Moreover, of all the juvenile kiIIings in the District in 1988, 
arguable none would have been prevented by the enactment and en-
forcement of the ordinance.so 
The approach adopted in Waters was not unique. Prior to the 
Waters decision, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the same 
type of analysis in Johnson v. City of Ope/ousas,sl and the Waters 
Court cited Johnson in support of its position. Johnson also involved a 
challenge to a curfew prohibiting a minor from being present in public 
during certain hours unless she were accompanied by her parent, tutor 
or other responsible adult.52 The curfew was chaIlenged by a mother 
and her son as being overbroad. It swept into its regulatory ambit con-
duct which constituted exercise of the freedoms of expression and asso-
ciation protected by the Constitution.53 As in Waters, the Court initial-
48. !d. 
49. !d. 
so. In 1988, 7% of the murder victims in the District were juveniles (26 out of a Iolal 
372). However, none of Ihe juveniles killed were "clearly killed al a lime or place that he or 
she would not have been had the curfew been in effect." Id. 
S!. 658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981). 
52. The ordinance provided in part: 
It shall be unlawful for any unemancipated minor under the age of seventeen 
(17) years to travel, loiter wander, stroll, or play in or upon or traverse any public 
streets, highways, roads, alleys, parks, places of amusements and entertainment, places 
and buildings, vacant lots or other unsupervised places in the City of Opelousas, 
Louisiana, between the hours of 11:00 p.m. on any Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, Wed· 
nesday or Thursday night and 4:00 a.m. of the following day, or 1:00 a.m. on any 
Friday or Saturday night and 4:00 a.m. of the .following day, all official time of the 
City of Opelousas, Louisiana, unless the said minor is accompanied by his parents, 
tutor or other responsible adult or unless the said minor is upon an emergency er-
rand. 
Any minor violating any of the provisions of this section shall be deemed a 
neglected child, ••• and such minor and his parents, tulor or other adult having the 
care and custody of such minor shall be dealt with under proper procedure in any 
juvenile court having jurisdiction over such child. 
!d. at 1067 n.l (citation omitted). 
53. Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1071. 
HeinOnline -- 5 St. Thomas L. Rev. 403 1992-1993
1993] JUVENILE CURFEW ORDINANCES 403 
ly detennined whether or not protected rights were involved, then as-
certained whether the state had greater authority to regulate a minor's 
exercise of these rights. Once again, Bellotti provided the standard for 
assessing the legitimacy of the state's actions. 
None of the Bellotti factors were found to justify the curfew's 
restrictions. There was no showing that juveniles were peculiarly vul-
nerable while traveling the streets to attend various "bona fide orga-
nized activity during the nighttime."S4 The association ai, employment 
and travel activities conducted by juveniles during the nighttime did not 
involve any critical decisions which would justify the state's intru-
sion.55 The appellate court conceded that the state may have a legiti-
mate concern over the presence of juveniles on the streets at night. 
However, the Johnson Court concluded that the parents, not the state, 
should detennine whether juveniles may engage in the type of night-
time activity proscribed by the ordinance.56 
The result and approach taken in Waters and Johnson have re-
ceived the support of some commentators and other courts.57 But, 
54. /d. at 1073. 
55. Id. 
56. /d. at 1073-74. The court placed special emphasis upon how broad the ordinance was: 
"under this ~urfew ordinance minors are prohibited from attending ~ciational activities such 
as religious or school meetings, organized dances, and theater and sporting events, when reason-
able and direct travel to or from these activities has to be made during the curfew period." Id. 
at 1072. Presumably in response to this kind of criticism, the District of Columbia provided 
such an exception in its ordinance. See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1141-42. However, even these 
exceptions were insufficient to save the ordinance in Waters. Even with its exemptions the 
ordinance reached every "innocent juvenile" in the District. Id. at 1136. ''Every juvenile in the 
District of Columbia would be arrested if he or she sought to wander the monuments at night, 
or if he or she sought to gaze at the stars from a public park." /d. Waters, therefore, is much 
broader in scope than Johnson. Johnson offered no opinion on the legality of an ordinance that 
provided sufficient exceptions. See Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1072. However, Waters suggests that 
an ordinance with exceptions is still constitutionally inadequate. Waters does not necessarily rule 
out the possihility of crafting a valid ordinance with exceptions, but it does leave one to won-
der how such an ordinance could be drafted to allow for a curfew broad enough to allow for 
"star-gazing." • 
It does not take much reading between the lines to see that the court in Waters was re-
jecting the status offense nature and assumptions undergirding the curfew ordinance. See supra 
notes 34, 39 and accompanying text. The court was simply unwilling to equate juvenile noctur-
nal activity with criminality. In fact, the court was "certain" that the number of innocent 
juveniles abroad at night far exceeds the number prone to commit crimes. Waters, 711 F. Supp. 
at 1136. Thus juveniles are as free as adults to star-gaze and this behavior by juveniles is no 
more indicative of anti-social or suspicious behavior than it would be by adults. 
57. See, e.g., McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381 (D.N.H. 1984) (using the 
three factor test in Bellotti to ascertain the legitimacy of constraints placed upon nocturnal 
activity of juveniles that would not be constitutionally valid if applied to adults); Allen v: City 
of Bordentown, 524 A.2d 478 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (using Bellotti to .determine that 
the state did not have a compelling interest justifying a curfew ordinance for minors); Note, 
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there is no consensus on the issue of whether these ordinances are 
constitutionally permissible. For example, in City of Panora v. 
Simmons,ss the Iowa Supreme Court's identification of the constitution-
al issues9 was similar to the views expressed in Waters and Johnson. 
The court agreed that the ordinance, if applied to adults, would restrain 
the exercise of fundamental rights. In Simmons, the rights at issue were 
those of interstate travel and the right to "wander and stroll about 
town."60 A further point of agreement between the cases is the 
Simmons Court's reliance upon Bellotti to provide the framework within 
which to assess the degree of deference that must be shown to the 
juvenile's rights. After this point, Simmons parts company with Waters. 
The Iowa Court prefaced its Bellotti analysis with the observation 
that the United States Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of a 
heightened state interest in regulating the activities of minors on city 
streets. The Iowa Court cited Prince v. Massachusetts61 as authority 
Assessing The Scope Of Minors' Fundamental Rights: Juvenile Curfews And The Constitution, 
m HARv. L. REv. 1163 (1984); Note, The Juvenile Curfew Ordinance: In Search of a New 
Standard of Review, 41 WASH. U. J. URB. & CON11lMP. L. 163 (1992). 
58. 445 N.W.2d 363 (Iowa 1989). As in Waters, the ordinance restricted the nocturnal 
activity of minors. It was unlawful "for any minor to be or remain upon any of the alleys, 
streets or public places or places of business and amusement in the city between the hours of 
ten (10) o'clock p.m. and five (5) o'clock a.m. of the following day." Id. at 364. Exceptions 
were provided for minors accompanied by a guardian, parent or other person charged with the 
care and custody of the minor. Minors who were traveling from their residence to any approved 
place of employment, church, municipal or school function were also exempt. Id. And, it was 
unlawful for a parent to allow a minor to be at any of the proscribed places during the pro-
scribed hours. /d. 
59. The statute was attacked as an unconstitutional invasion of the right to gather, walk or 
loiter in the city. Id. at 366-67. The Court believed the key issue in the case was whether the 
ordinance implicated a juvenile's fundamental right to engage in these activities. If a fundamen-
tal right were involved, the level of judicial scrutiny brought to bear on the statute would be 
raised from a rational relationship test to that of strict scrutiny. Id. at 367. 
60. Id. The right to ''wander and stroll" was found in the Supreme Court's decision in 
Papachristou. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1m2). Waters cited and 
relied upon Papachristou. See Waters, 711 F. Supp. at 1134. Johnson did not explicitly rely 
upon Papachristou but identified the right to travel freely within a state and the right to 
associate freely as implicated by the ordinance. See Johnson, 658 F.2d at 1072. However one 
characterizes the rights involved in the three cases, all of the courts recognized that the ordi-
nance, if applied to adults, would implicate a fundamental right. Thus, any distinction between 
the cases cannot rest upon the right itself but must be due to the court's analysis of whether 
the right, when exercised by juveniles, retained its "fundamental" and protected character. 
61. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). Prince involved a challenge to a Massachusetts child labor stat-
ute prohibiting minors from selling newspapers and magazines on public streets. It was also 
unlawful for anyone to provide magazines or newspapers to minors which he knew the minor 
intended to sell. Sarah Prince was convicted of violating the statute when she allowed a minor, 
over whom she had legal custody, to distribute religious material on a public street. The statute 
was challenged as a violation of Ms. Prince's First Amendment right to freedom of religion and 
a violation of her parental rights as secured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
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for this proposition, which provided the backdrop against which the 
court assessed the applicability of the Bellotti factors. In the Iowa 
Court's view, youths abroad at night are more vulnerable to crime and 
peer pressure than adults. This peculiar vulnerability combined with a 
minor's immaturity lead to delinquent acts or involvement in drug 
use.62 The state's exercise of control over a minor's freedom of 
movement also had the beneficial effect of promoting the important 
role of parents in child-rearing by reinforcing parental authority and 
encouraging parents to take an active role in supervising their chil-
dren.63 In effect, the same test applied to virtually the same restric-
tions leads to diametrically opposed results. And, the Iowa Supreme 
Court's analysis cannot be dismissed as an aberration. Other courts 
have assessed the validity of curfew ordinances and reached a result in 
accord with Simmons.64 
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S VISION OF THE AMERICAN 
FAMILY 
A. THE TRADmONAL FAMILY 
The conflicting results reached by the courts should not be sur-
prising. Indeed it is unavoidable given the United States Supreme 
Court's stance on how states must determine whether a minor's consti-
tutional rights equate with those of an adult. Bellotti does not represent 
a comprehensive theory explaining precisely when and on what basis 
the rights of a minor are coextensive with those of an adult. At best, 
Bellotti represents a catalogue of factors the Supreme Court found 
significant in its previous decisions assessing whether or not a state 
Amendment. The latter right protected her authority to raise her children as required by the 
tenets of her faith, one of which required the distribution of religious literature. 
Wbile the Court accepted the idea of the family as the primary institution charged with 
the care and custody of children, it rejected the notion that therefore the family was beyond regula-
tion by the state. /d. at 166. Moreover, even though the conduct, when engaged in by an adult, 
was beyond regulation, this fact did not preclude the state from regulating the conduct of the 
child. /d. at 168. The state's authority over children is broader and may proscribe certain types 
of conduct that pose more of a threat to children than to adults. Distributing material on public 
streets was an example of this type of conduct. Id. at 168-69. This was true even thougb a 
parent might judge the dangers inherent in the conduct to be negligible or nonexistent. Id. at 
170. 
62. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d at 368. 
63. /d. 
64. See, e.g., Bykofsky v. Borough Of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), 
affd, 535 F.2d 1245 (3d eir. 1976), eerl. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976); People ex reL I.M., 
768 P.2d 219 (Colo. 1989) (en banc); Village of Deerfield v. Greenberg, 550 N.E.2d 12 (III. 
App. Ct. 1990). 
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may treat minors differently from adults. This approach is mandated by 
what the Court articulated as the unique role of the family in soci-
ety.65 The inconsistency between Waters and Simmons is attributable 
to what the Supreme Court viewed as the need for sensitivity and flexi-
bility in applying constitutional principles to an institution as unique 
and important as the family.66 Since it is the family's unique role that 
drives the constitutional analysis of Bellotti and the analysis of curfew 
ordinances, a critical question is, "How does the Court define the 
family's role?" 
After reviewing decisions relating to families and the relationship 
between families and the state, the Court asserted that certain· principles 
emanate from these decisions. "It is cardinal with us that the custody, 
car~ and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary 
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can 
neither supply nor hinder ( . .. [a]nd it is in recognition of this that 
these decisions have respected the private realm of family life which 
the state cannot enter)."67 The constitutional recognition and protection 
of the family's sanctity is based upon an acknowledgment that the 
family is deeply rooted in the American tradition and performs a func-
tion peculiar to it. In Moore v. City of East Cleveiand,68 Justice 
Powell observed that "lilt is through the family that we inculcate and 
pass down many of the most cherished values, moral and cultural."69 
These values include those attributes necessary for a democracy, such 
as elements of g~od citizenship and preparation for meaningful and 
rewarding participation in a free society.7o Implicit in these views is 
the notion that families stand between. society and the individual. It is 
from this vantage point that the family serves as a kind of membrane 
through which cultural values and traditions are filtered and assimilated 
by children.71 
65. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634. 
66. ld. 
67. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. 
68. 431 U.s. 494 (1977). In Moore, a city ordinance was challenged as a violation of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The ordinance limited the occupancy of 
dwelling units to members of a single family. However, the definition of family effectively 
precluded some related family members from living together. In a plurality opinion, Justice 
Powell found the ordinance violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 
69. ld. at 503-04. 
70. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 638-39. 
71. The family is charged with the crucial responsibility of preserving society and the state. 
Yet, the state acts most judiciously when it abstains from interfering in the workings of the 
family. Self-preservation is achieved by noninterference, or a kind of passivity which seems 
inconsistent with protecting such a significant interest as self-preservation. But see Smith v. 
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Moreover, the Court has made it clear that the process of accul-
turation occurring in families is not biologically rooted. The mere fact 
of a biological relationship between the parent and child plays little if 
any role in preparing children for their responsibilities in life. "[T]he 
importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and 
to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from 
the intimacy of daily association and from the role it plays in 
'promot[ing] a way of life' through the instruction of children as 
well as from the fact of blood relationships."n 
Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.s. 816, 844 (1977), and Lehr v. Robinson, 463 U.S. 
248 (1983) (foster families may perform significant familial functions similar to biological 
families but are subject to a higher degree of state regulation and intervention). At a very basic 
level it appears that the Court believes if the family is left alone it will do the "right thing" 
and make the "right choices" that support basic values and good citizenship. Support for this 
proposition is found in the continuous existence of the traditional family (as defmed by the 
Court), a stable society, and a democratic state. These seemingly self-evident propositions 
provide the Court's position with an intuitive appeal. The Court's conclusions appear natural 
and irrefutable. After al~ how can one argue with the way things are and the way they have 
always been? See Morton J. Horowitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. 
L REV. 1423, 1427 (1982) [hereinafter Horowitz, The History]. Perhaps the gr~test power of 
this formulation is found in its acceptance at a level that is "implicitly understood" as a 
cultural phenomenon. It is, therefore, rarely, if ever, consciously questioned. See supra notes 25-
26 and accompanying text. 
Moreover, even if we assume that noninterference is in fact the position adopted by the 
state, the Court does not explain exactly how the family does the "right thing" and makes the 
"right choices'; when it is left to its own devices. It is suggested that families are able to 
inculcate moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship by ''teaching, 
guiding, and inspiring by precept and example." See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 637-38. Presumably 
this process provides both the substantive standards and procedural mechanisms by which the 
family performs its pivotal role in preserving the state and society. Exactly where these moral 
standards originate and whether they need to be uniformly accepted by all families or certain 
families is never explained by the Court. 
72. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) (quoting Wisconsin 
v. Yoder, 406 U.s. 205, 231-33 (1972)}. In Smith, the Court acknowledged that a foster family 
may have a constitutionally protected liberty interest capable of violation by a state which 
adopts inadequate procedures for determining when to remove a child. However, notwithstanding 
the emotional attachments that may develop in a foster family, the Court identified an important 
distinction between a biological family' and a foster family. The latter has its origins in state 
law and contractual arrangements. Id. at 845. Owing to its origins in "positive law," foster 
families are from the outset formed in partnership with the state. The state, because of its 
involvement from the beginning, may place limitations upon the rights and expectations of the 
participants in that familial relationship. Id.at 845-46. Even though the Court recognizes the 
importance of familial relationships and the significant role these relationships play in securing 
the future and integrity of society, a state's involvl:ment in the creation of these relationships 
renders them vulnerable to subsequent state intervention. 
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.s. 248 (1983), is another example of the Court's view of the 
family as a system of emotional attachments and relationships rather than exclusive biological 
kinship. The Court rejected the claim of a father that the Due Process Clause was violated by 
a state statute for failure to provide him with notice of the adoption of his child who y."as born 
out of wedlock. For the Court, the significance of the liberty interest at stake was not the 
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Public schools are another institution in which minors are likely to 
spend a great deal of time. The Court views public schools as perform-
ing an assimilative role closely resembling that performed by families . . 
Public schools obviously are not families, but the Court's description of 
them leaves little doubt that schools are akin to families in preserving 
those values most cherished in society. Schools prepare individuals for 
partiCipation in society and transmit values. They are perceived as an 
"assimilative force" in harmonizing diverse and disparate elements in 
society.73 Using virtually the same language employed in describing 
the historically significant function performed by families, the Court 
endorsed the view that public schools "inculcat[e] fundamental values 
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system . . . ."74 
Thus, two of the more significant institutions in the lives of minors are 
charged with similar responsibilities, although one acts in the private 
realm; the other is explicitly public. 
father's biological parentage, but whether there existed an ongoing relationship between the 
father and the child. No such relationship existed and his liberty interest was correspondingly 
reduced. !d. at 260-65. 
73. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979). 
74. !d. at 77. The Court explicated its view of the significant role of teachers in the lives 
of students as follows: 
Within the public school system, teachers play a critical part in developing a 
student's attitude towards government and understanding of the role of citizens in our 
society. Alone among employees of the system, teachers are in direct, day-to-day 
contact with students both in the classrooms and in the other varied activities of a 
modem school. In shaping the student's experience to achieve educational goals, 
teachers by necessity have wide discretion over the way the course material is com-
municated to students • • • • Further, a teacher serves as a role model for his stu-
dents, exerting a subtle but important influence over their perceptions and values. 
Thus, through both the presentation of course materials and the example he sets, a 
teacher has an opportunity to influence the attitudes of students toward government, 
the political process, and a citizen's social responsibilities. This influence is crucial to 
the continued good health of a democracy. 
!d. at 78-79 (footnotes omitted). 
Except for the word "teacher," the quote sounds very similar to the Court's comments 
about the significance of the family. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text. This close 
identity of purposes between schools and families is due in part to the compulsory education 
system serving to "Americanize" each successive wave of European immigrants. See CHRISTO-
PHER LAsCH, CULWRB OF NARCISSISM 232-37 (1978). See also Samuel Bowles, Unequal Edu-
cation and the Reproduction of the Social Division of Labor, in SCHOOUNG IN A CORPORATB 
SOCIBlY: THE POUllCAL ENEMY OF EDUCATION IN AMERICA (M. Carnoy cd., 1972) (schools 
evolved in America not as part of a pursuit of equality but to: meet the needs of capitalist 
employers for a disciplined work force; to provide mechanisms for social control in the interests 
of political stability; and to facilitate the reproduction of the class structure from one generation 
to the next). 
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B. QUESTIONS LEFT UNANSWERED By THE COURT'S VIEW OF 
FAMIUES 
409 
Given the Court's perspective on families it should not be surpris-
ing that it has never endorsed the notion that a minor's constitutional 
rights are always coextensive with those of an adult. Instead, the Court 
proceeds on an issue-by-issue approach, assessing the various interests 
involved, and either extends, withholds, or modifies the particular con-
stitutional right.75 But, lurking behind this case-by-case approach are 
several questions which are troublesome. For example, are rights grant-
ed to children in order to allow the family to function better as a unit? 
Or do rights allow individual family members - minors - to prosper 
as individuals even if individual success or happiness may impair the 
cohesiveness or effectiveness of the family in performing its historically 
and constitutionally recognized role?76 
This question is engendered by the Court's focus upon the family 
as an organic unit rather than as a collection of individuals. In this 
75. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (First Amendment 
rights of students in public schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults 
in other settings); New Jersey v. T.L.O .. 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (the Fourth Amendment protec-
tion afforded children in a school setting is not the same as that of adults in other settings); 
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (not all constitutional rights assured to an adult 
accused of a crime must be made available to a minor in a delinquency proceeding; a state 
therefore need not provide a jury trial during the adjudicative phase of a state juvenile court 
delinquency proceeding); Ginsberg v. New York, -390 U.S. 629 (1968) (a state may restrict a 
minor's right to determine for herself what sex material she may read and see even if the same 
restriction would be unconstitutional if applied to adults). See also Note, Developments In The 
Law, the Constitution and the Family, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1156, 1358-77 (1980) [hereinafter 
Note, Developments] (discussing the distinction between the constitutional rights of adults and 
children and the basis therefore). 
76. The Court recognized that the rights of an individual may not necessarily be consistent 
with the rights and interests of other members of the family unit. Bellotti v. Baird 443 U.S. 
623 (1978). Bellotti is an example of this problem. 'A mature minor's decision to have an 
abortion may not represent the same conclusion a parent would reach, yet the Court upheld the 
right of the minor to make that decision. See it!. at 642-44. Consider also the case of an emo-
tionally-disturbed or mentally-ill min9r. The minor's behavior may not only be self-destructive, 
but disruptive of the lives of other family members or the family unit as a whole. However, 
the minor may not wish to seek treatment, or if treatment is desired, she may not wish to seek 
the particular type of treatment advocated by her parents. In this situation, the minor and 
parents are, if not adversaries, at least individuals with dissimilar interests. Yet, the Court in 
this context recognizes no real conflict since it assumes the parent will act in the minor's best 
interests, whether or not the minor is cognizant of this fact. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 
602-03 (1979). Thus, a minor is not constitutionally entitled to a full adversarial hearing on her 
interest in not being committed to a state institution. See id. at 605-10. See also Note, Develop-
ments, supra note 75, at 1377-83 (discussing the issue of the extent to which the interest of a 
parent and the interests of a child may not be in harmony). 
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view "[t]he family, in short, is the meaning of life, that which alone 
validates one's struggles and aspirations, so that life outside it is devoid 
of any ultimate human value."71 An alternative view of the family 
conceives of it not as an organic unit, but as a collection of individ-
uals, each possessing rights independent of the other.78 The litmus test 
for extending or withholding rights _ to minors under the latter view is 
the extent to which rights directly or indirectly enhance the autonomy 
of the individual. Whether or not the extension of rights is also consis-
tent with the collective interest or vision of the family is not of prima-
ry importance. Supreme Court decisions tend to accept the view of the 
family as having a single, collective interest that is presumed to be 
consistent with the individual interests of family members.79 
Notwithstanding the Court's tendency to equate the interest of the 
family unit with those of individual members, the distinction between 
77. David A.J. Richards, The ltulividua~ The Family, And The Constitution: A Jurispruden. 
tial Perspective, SS N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 37-38 (1980) [hereinafter Richards, The IndividualJ. 
Professor Richards views this dermition of family as metaphysical in that it attempts to define 
ultimate reality and ignores -any dermition or empirical evidence inconsistent with the dermition. 
This perspective on the family has empirical validity if it is relegated to defining families in 
pre-industrial society. At that time, families were a major social institution performing many 
functions and derming the moral climate of society as a whole. The same cannot be said of 
modem ind~rial society where the family is stripped of many of these functions and must 
compete with other institutions in derming ethical conduct. Id. at 38. 
78. Id. at 37. For Professor Richards,- the human rights theory undergirding the Constitution 
is the belief that every person has the capacity for autonomy and has the right to equal con-
cern and respect in her pursuit of autonomy. Id. at 8-10. This principle, however, does not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that children must have rights equal to those of adults. 
Intrusive regUlation of the lives of children may be necessary to enable them to become 
autonomous. Children may lack fully-developed, rational capacities which are a necessary 
prerequisite to exercising autonomy. There may be instances in which children will, therefore, 
engage in irrational behavior which permanently impairs their ability to achieve their own ends 
and may limit the ability of a child to define the proper ends in life. Id. at 23·28. 
79. Id. at 37. Professor Richards refers to Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) to 
demonstrate the confusion of individual and collective interests. The Court held that Wisconsin's 
compulsory education law could not be applied to Amish children who had completed the 
eighth grade. Applying the law to these children would violate the parent's right to educate 
their children according to Amish beliefs and methods. This holding, however much it respects 
the rights of Amish parents, violates a basic principle of human rights. Parental authority over 
children rests upon the assumption that the limitation upon the autonomy of children is justified 
by the assumption that parents are preparing children for "rational independence, including the 
capacity to evaluate critically, as free and rational individuals, what life to lead." Ric~ards, The 
ltulividual, supra note 77, at 42. There is little doubt that the decision fostered maintenance of 
the Amish community and family, but did little to enhance the development of Amish children 
by providing them with the opportunity to develop rational independence through exposure to 
other values and the world beyond the borders of the Amish community. For Professor Rich-
ards, the Court's opinion conflated the interests of Amish children with those of the Amish 
family. It created an identity of interest between the Amish family and Amish children. Id. at 
42-43. 
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the two interests is generally accepted and elevated to the level of a 
general theory on the historical evolution of the family. The family is 
seen as developing along a continuum from patriarchal domination to 
the liberation of individual members with rights protected by the 
state.so The problem with this approach is that is obfuscates rather 
than clarifies the issue. By viewing the family as moving along a path 
towards the liberation of individuals, there is a tendency to view this 
movement as inexorable. Contemporary families and the problems they 
face are seen as an inevitable by-product of American history. An 
institution which is an historical and cultural phenomenon with numer-
ous possibilities for change and development is placed beyond the reach 
of human intervention. Instead, it represents the irresistible and unalter-
able movement of history toward the final end product of the family 
unit as we know it tOday.81 
The same can be said of the view that the family represents an 
so. See generally SWART EWEN, CAPTAINS OF CONSCIOUSNESS: ADVERll~ING AND llJE 
SOCIAL ROOTS OF CONSUMER CULWRE, PART III (1976); CHRISTOPHER LAsCH, HAVEN IN A 
HFARlLESS WORLD, THE FAMILY BESIEGED (1977) [hereinafter LAsCH, HAVEN]; CHRISTOPHER 
LAsCH, THE NEW RADICALISM IN AMERICA 1889-1963 (1965) [hereinafter LAsCH, NEW RADI-
CALISM]; S. MORSE, Family Law In Transition: From Traditional Families To Individual Liber-
ty, in CHANGING IMAGES OF mE FAMILY (V. Tufte & B. Myerhoff eds., 1979); Bruce L 
Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy In Family Law: The Waning Of Belonging, 1991 B.Y.U. L. 
REv. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy]; Martha Minow, Forming 
Underneath Everything That Grows: Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 WIS. L REV. 819 
(1985). 
81. Another critical deficiency in this view is that it fails to recognize the extent to which 
the family is subject to direct conscious control and manipUlation through public policy initia-
tives. This too has escaped the notice of both the lay public and social historians. 
Historians of the family have paid too little attention to the way in which public 
policy, sometimes conceived quite deliberately not as a defense of the family at all 
but as an invasion of it, contributed to the deterioration of domestic life. The family 
did not simply evolve in response to social and economic influences; it was deliber-
ately transformed by the intervention of planners and policymakers. Educators and 
social reformers saw that the family, especially the immigrant family, stood as an 
obstacle to what they conceived as social progress - in other words, to homogeniza-
tion and "Americanization." The family preserved separatist religious traditions, alien 
languages and dialects, local lore, and other traditions that retarded the growth of the 
political community and the national state. Accordingly, reformers sought to remove 
children from the influence of their families, which they also blamed for exploiting 
child labor, and to place the young under the benign influence of state and school. 
LAsCH, HAVEN supra note SO, at 13. 
See also Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L REv. 57, 70 (1984) 
[hereinafter Gordon, CriticalJ (arguing that the dominant tradition in legal thinking assumes that 
society naturally evolves towards liberal capitalism and the natural and proper function of a 
legal system is to facilitate this process. The world is therefore seen as largely determined by 
impersonal social forces rather than as manufactured by people who assert that they are passive-
ly adapting to inevitable processes). Again, this process is seen as being as natural and irrefut-
able as the Supreme Court's view of the relationship among the family, society and democratic 
government. See supra note 71. 
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organic unit. Whether the family is an association of autonomous indi-
viduals pursuing their separate interests or individuals' bound by their 
allegiance to a collective family interest, both positions view the family 
and the relationship between it and other institutions as being driven by 
forces beyond human control. Lost in all of this is the idea that the 
family is an historically and culturally contingent institution that may, 
at various times, be individualistic or group-oriented. When using either 
standard for assessing the existence or extent of the rights of minors, 
the same bottom line exists. Somehow the rights of minors will in 
some measure be dependent upon an invisible but powerful force con-
trolling the direction of family development. Rights are tied to invisible 
forces whose power we feel and whose command we must obey, but 
whose will is not fully comprehended. 
And, there is another related and equally significant question 
raised by the Supreme Court's view of the relationship between fami-
lies and society. What does the Court mean when it associates the 
family with a private realm in which it performs functions necessary 
for the preservation of basic values and public institutions?82 Lest one 
think this difficulty in defining the relationship between the family and 
society is limited to the judicial sphere, consider once again the report 
of the National Commission On Children. The Commission Report 
makes it very apparent that the Commission and the Supreme Court 
B;? The Court's simple formulation "feels" intuitively correct. It conjures up images of an 
institution that appears to be omnipresent across time and societies. In this respect, families are 
viewed as a natural phenomenon largely beyond state regulation and indeed resistant to the 
efforts of the state to change natural contours of the families. This imagery places the family in 
the Lockean tradition of natural rights. The family is an institution rooted in certain inalienable 
rights held in the pre-governmental state of nature. See Paul Brest, State Action And Liberal 
Theory: A Case Note On Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1296 (1982) [here-
inafter Brest, State Action]. This differs from a more positivist view which asserts that citizens 
entering civil society relinquish al1 natural rights and possess only those granted by the legisla-
ture. ]d. at 1297. The tension between these competing views is evident when one considers 
that family law often influenced attempts to legislate a public code of morality which placed 
limits upon acceptable forms of conduct within the family. See Note, Developments, supra note 
75, at 1202-13; Carl Schneider, Moral Discourse And The Transformation of American Family 
Law, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1803 (1985) [hereinafter Schneider, Moral Discourse] (arguing that 
family law has undergone a transformation from a discourse in moral terms about the relation-
ship between family members, to a transfer of moral decision-making authority to individuals 
that the law formerly regulated). It is, therefore, difficult to comprehend precisely what the 
Court means when it speaks of an essential1y private institution performing essential functions 
for society, particularly when that institution was subject to legislatively imposed views of how 
it and its members ought to behave. If families are not natural in the Lockean sense but are 
what the state allows them to be, private behavior in the families would always implicate 
public policy (morality) in some way. See Brest, State Action, supra at 1301. See also supra 
note 72. 
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share some common views on the relationship between the family, 
minors and the state. 
The Commission Report is a bipartisan assessment of the social 
circumstances facing children and sought "to serve as a forum on be-
half of the children of the Nation."83 The Commission's broad charter 
directed the Commission to examine issues of health, education, social 
support, income security, tax policy, and to develop approaches to meet 
the needs of children in these areas.84 Equally as broad was the per-
spective from which the Commission assessed the problems facing chil-
dren. Instead of focusing exclusively on individual families and their 
problems, the inquiry expanded to include the organization, structure 
and policies of institutions that affect families and children.8S Given 
the Commission's charge - to develop an action agenda for the 1990s 
- the Commission Report repreSents a contemporary bipartisan state-
ment of general consensus on the problems facing children and fami-
lies.86 
What is important here is not the specific recommendations of the 
Commission, but rather what the Commission termed its "Principles For 
Action."87 These principles served as the foundation upon which all of 
the Commission's specific recommendations were built. One principle 
announced that children should have the opportunity to develop to their 
full potential and it is the primary r~sponsibility of parents to provide 
guidance and to meet their children's needs - physical, emotional and 
intellectual. 88 
The Commission also endorsed the position that the family bears 
the primary responsibility for inculcating basic values necessary for 
society and democracy. However, the family is not completely autono-
mous. Society has a legitimate interest in how children are raised and 
must intervene when parents engage in behavior that places their chil-
dren at risk.89 
83. NATIONAL COMM'N, BEYOND RHB1URIC, supra note 9, at viii. 
84. /d. at ix. 
85. See id. at xi-xii. 
86. This is not to say that the findings and recommendations of the Commission represent, 
in fact, a consensus of Americans' views on the family and its problems. However, given the 
conscious attempt to diversify the composition of the Commission and its methodology of con-
ducting hearings and meetings around the country, it is fair to say that the Commission Report 
is perceived as, and was intended to articulate, at a very general level, principles and views 
upon which most Americans would agree. See id. at viii-x. 
'Ol. /d. at xix. 
88. /d. at 63-65. 
89. See id. at 68-74. 
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These Principles For Action are virtually the same as those artic-
ulated. by the Supreme Court in defining the nature of the family and 
its relationship to society in preparing children to become responsible 
citizens. Specifically, the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he duty to pre-
pare the child for additional obligations . . . must be read to include 
the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of 
good citizenship . . . . This affirmative process of teaching, guiding, 
and inspiring by precept and example is essential to the growth of 
young people into mature, socially responsible citizens.»90 And, like 
the Commission, the Court asserted that ". . . this process, in large 
part, is beyond the competence of impersonal political institutions. »91 
It is not a coincidence that the Commission and the Supreme Court 
agree on these basic principles. The reason for this similarity was artic-
ulated by the Commission's observation that Americans tend to view 
the caring and rearing of children as a private matter and not a public 
responsibility.92 
However, this position is in stark contrast to the charge issued to 
the Commission. Developing an action agenda for the 1990s by for-
mulating specific governmental programs to implement this agenda 
explicitly invokes public resources and institutions to intervene in a 
private realm - the family.93 The Commission acknowledged the ten-
sion existing between the public and private nature of the family. Yet, 
the Commission offered no solution other than to announce that there is 
a growing consensus on the importance of addressing the needs of 
children through a combination of individual actions, private sector 
decisions, and public sector reforms. No clue is given as to how these 
various resources are to coalesce in a way that maintains child-rearing 
as a private as opposed to a public function.94 Since the Commission 
makes recommendations for specific courses of action, one can only as-
sume that these proposals represent an appropriate blending of public 
and private resources that will leave intact the quintessentially private 
nature of the family. 
Essentially, the same problem facing the Commission confronts the 
90. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 637-38. 
91. Id. at 638. 
92. NATIONAL COMM'N, BEYOND RHETORIC, supra note 9, at 61. 
93. Some of the proposals called for specific governmental actions. For example, the 
Commission recommended the creation of a "$1,000 refundable child tax credit for all children 
through age 18 and elimination of the personal exemption for dependent children to partially 
offset the costs." /d. at xxi. For a detailed statement of the Commission's proposals, see Id. at 
Part n. 
94. /d. at 62. 
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courts in their struggle to assess the validity of curfew statutes. There 
is an inability to identify a clear point of demarcation that separates 
those nocturnal activities of a minor whose legitimacy should be deter-
mined in the private realm of family decision-making, and other types 
of conduct and family decision-making that is vulnerable to state inter-
vention. For example, in People ex rei J.M.,95 the court applied the 
three factor Bellotti test96 and found that a minor's right to "loiter" is 
not coextensive with that of an adult and, therefore, was not a funda-
mental right.97 This conclusion is not unique since other courts have 
reached the same conclusion.98 But even when Bellotti resolves the 
problem as to what level of scrutiny applies in reviewing a particular 
ordinance or governmental action,99 there remains the very basic and 
unresolved question of government intervention in a "private" realm in 
the name of a "public interest." 
In J.M., the Colorado Court applied the third Bellotti factor - the 
importance of the parental role in child-rearing - and found that the 
ordinance reinforced parental authority and encouraged parents to take 
an. active role in supervising minors.1°O The ordinance was, therefore, 
one which regulated behavior that did not involve a fundamental liberty 
interest. Yet this determination did not eliminate the existence of the 
conflict between the public interest and the sanctity of the family. 
Though the ordinance was subject to the rational basis standard of 
review,101 a justification had to be found for exercising state power to 
'preempt the decision of either the family or the minor. One justification 
advanced and accepted by the court was the state's interest in enforcing 
parental control over children.102 Regardless of how the particular 
court applies Bellotti, there remains the very basic issue of state inter-
vention into priv3:te family life. Bellotti does no more than resolve the 
question of what level of scrutiny will be applied to the curfew ordi-
nance. It does not resolve the difficult questions of on what basis 
95. 768 P.2d 219 (Colo. 1989). The challenged ordinance made it unlawful for anyone 
under 18 years to loiter in various public and private locations during the enumerated hours, 
without the consent of the owner or occupant of the location involved. The ordinance was 
inapplicable to minors accompanied by a parent, guardian or other adult over the age of 21. ld. 
at 221. 
96. ]d. at 223. 
m. ]d. 
98. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text. 
99. See J-M., 768 P.2d at 221, 223. See generally LAURENCB H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
S'ITIUl10NAL LAw, Cb. 15 (2d ed. 1988). 
100. J-M., 768 P.2d at 223. 
101. ]d. 
102. ]d. 
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should the state intervene or abstain from involvement in family deci.: 
sion making, and whether the private realm imagery as applied to the 
family is a meaningful and accurate description of the relationship be-
tween the family and the state. 
ill. PUBLIC INTERVENTION IN THE NAME OF SURROGATE 
PARENTING 
Whether or not curfew ordinances will be found constitutional is 
inextricably tied to the view of the family as having a dual nature. 
Whether one looks to a contemporary political statement concerning the 
nature of the problem facing families and children, i.e., the Commission 
Report, or to judicial decisions addressing the constitutionality of cur-
few ordinances, one is still confronted with the same rhetoric. That is, 
the family is seen as a preeminently private institution performing 
important functions which are necessary for the preservation of society 
and democratic government. It appears, therefore, that the legality of 
curfew ordinances is being determined by using some of the same 
principles and rhetoric that serve as the basis for political solutions to 
the problems facing children in the 1990s and beyond. There will be a 
search for the elusive but proper balance between public intervention 
and family autonomy. However, while attention is focused upon what is 
the proper balance and how it will be obtained, little if any attention is 
paid to asking the basic question of exactly what is meant when the 
distinction is made between the private inviolate world of the family 
versus its public responsibilities and functions. 
This section will explore this question and demonstrate how the 
Supreme Court's line of demarcation between the public and private 
nature of the family is not a bright one and is, at best, dim and waver-
ing. Rather than representing a fixed, legal or constitutional principle 
when applied to minors, and in particular juvenile delinquents, it is 
more akin to an indication of the shifting political and cultural consen-
sus existing at a particular' time. 
A. GAULT. How To FIx A SYSTEM WHEN IT's NOT REALLY 
BROKEN 
The Supreme Court's decision in In re Gauitl°3 is an example 
103. 387 u.s. 1 (1967). Gerald Gault was a fifteen-year-old taken into custody on the basis 
of a complaint that he made lewd telephone calls to a neighbor. He was adjudicated delinquent 
and committed to the State Industrial School. Gault's parents challenged the constitutionality of 
the adjudicatory stage of the state juvenile process. The Court held that the constitutional guar-
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of how analytically dysfunctional and misleading the private realm 
imagery is when used in connection with the family. Gault assessed the 
constitutional validity of a state's juvenile justice system and in the 
process, discussed the basis for the state's authority to intervene in 
what was otherwise considered the private activity of minors and their 
families. Justice Fortas, writing for the Supreme Court, devoted a great 
deal of his opinion to a recitation of the historical and theoretical un-
derpinnings of the juvenile justice system. He accepted the view that 
reformers envisioned the system as an alternative to the criminal justice 
system. In fact, the juvenile system was designed to serve as a surro-
gate parent. Children had a right "not to liberty but to custody."l04 
Juvenile courts were, therefore, performing a custodial rather than puni-
tive function. lOS 
After reciting this history, the opinion takes a curious turn. Justice 
Fortas observed that notwithstanding .the fact that a spirit of enlighten-
ment and concern for youth spawned the juvenile justice system, the 
constitutional and theoretical bases for the entire system are deb at-
able.106 As pointed out by Justice Harlan in his' concurring opinion, 
the majority never explains what is theoretically or constitutionally 
suspect about the system.107 This questioning of the system by Jus-
tice Fortas is followed by an extensive explication of how the system 
failed to achieve its original goals. This was due, in part, to the ab-
sence of procedural safeguards at the adjudicatory stage of juvenile' 
court proceedings.1OS However, the opinion further explains how pro-
cedural safeguards would enhance, not diminish, the ability of the state 
to achieve the substantive benefits the system was designed to accom-
plish.109 
It does not require much reflection to realize that the meandering 
course of the opinion suggests, at certain points, contradictory conclu-
sions. For example, if as the Court suggests, the juvenile court were 
flawed both theoretically and constitutionally at its inception, it would 
make little if any difference what the original motivation and vision of 
antee of due process applies to juvenile delinquency proceedings where the juvenile may be 
committed to a state institution. Several of the procedural rights applicable to adult criminal 
proceedings applied to delinquency proceedings as well. These rights included the right to be 
represented by counsel, to receive notice, and the privilege against self incrimination. 
104. /d. at 17. 
IDS. Jd. 
106. /d. 
107. Id. at 66. 
108. Id. at 17-21. 
109. Jd. at 21-26. 
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the reformers were. These observations are relevant insofar as they 
underscore how the reformers' benign motivation did not prevent them 
from erring and running afoul of the Constitution. Qearly this was not 
the purpose of Justice Fortas' recapitulation of the system's history. 
The tone of his observations is sympathetic to the objectives and moti-
vation of the reformers. Another observation made by Justice Fortas, 
which is no less difficult to fathom, is that if the system were funda-
mentally flawed, how could procedural safeguards shore-up the system? 
Justice Harlan sensed these inconsistencies and questioned the relevance 
of the observations asserted by the majority. He suggested that the 
frustrated expectations of the system's founders were irrelevant unless 
the Court was questioning the wisdom of having a separate juvenile 
justice system.110 
Justice Harlan's intuition that something was awry in the majority 
opinion is correct, but the Court was not questioning the wisdom or 
basic assumptions of the system's founders. Quite simply, the Court 
was willing to accept a system with a debatable justification if it 
worked - if it in fact functioned as a surrogate parent and successfully 
performed its custodial function. It was only when the system failed to 
meet its goals that it was transmogrified into a benevolently motivated 
system exercising a dangerously high level of unbridled discretion that 
defeated rather than served the system's purposes. 
This same theme was articulated a year earlier in Kent v. United 
States,111 where the Court made explicit the calculus it used in assess-
ing the validity of a juvenile court system that did not provide the 
procedural safeguards found in the adult criminal justice system. After 
conceding the special needs of the child-oriented juvenile court system, 
the Court turned to the pragmatic question of the juvenile court's per-
formance: 
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of 
the juvenile courts, studies. and critiques in recent years raise seri-
ous questions as to whether actual perfonnance measures well 
enough against theoretical purposes to make tolerable the immunity 
of the process from the reach of constitutional guarantees applica-
ble to adults. There is much evidence that some juvenile 
110. /d. at 67. 
111. 383 U.S. 541 (1966): Kent involved a challenge to the validity of a juvenile court's 
waiver of jurisdiction over a minor. The statute governing the procedure provided that waiver of 
jurisdiction was available only after a full investigation was conducted. The question before the 
Court was whether the juvenile court conducted a Cull investigation within the meaning of the 
statute. The Court determined that the juvenile court's investigation was inadequate in that it 
did not afford the juvenile adequate procedural protection. 
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courts, ... lack the personnel, facilities and techniques to perform 
adequately as representatives of the State in a parens patriae ca-
pacity, at least with respect to children charged with law viola-
tions.112 
419 
There are limits, however, on the extent to which the Court is willing 
to allow the failures of the juvenile court to totally undennine the 
validity of the system. What the Court identified as debatable premises 
undergirding the system are now well entrenched, and the System is 
subject only to periodic adjustments rather than a massive overhaul. ll3 
B. GAULT AND THE MELDING OF POUTICS, LAw AND CULTURE 
Behind the pragmatic assessment of the juvenile court's effective-
ness and the level of success required to justify the system's immunity 
from scrutiny is the unquestioning acceptance of the idea that the state 
is capable of acting and should act as a surrogate parent. In other 
words, there are circumstances that dictate that the private realm of the 
family must yield to state intervention. However, effective intervention 
does not destroy the private character of the family. The state is as-
suming a different identity and acting as a parent would if she were 
able to intervene on behalf of the minor. Rather than weakening the 
private nature of the family, state intervention reinforces it by serving 
as a model for how the family should act in the best interests of the 
child.u4 
112. /d. at 555·56. 
113. See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.s. 253 (1984) (holding the Constitution does not 
mandate the elimination of all differences between the treatment of minors and adults - the 
state's parens patriae interest in promoting the welfare of minors justifies a juvenile system 
fundamentally different from that of the adult system); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 
(1971) (finding previous rulings by the Supreme Court mandating procedural safeguards for 
juveniles were not intended to undermine the purpose of the juvenile justice system or its in-
formality and flexibility). 
114. The system may not in fact have had such benign origins. The advocates of reform 
viewed themselves as disinterested advocates motivated by conscience and morality rather than 
class or political interests. See ANnlONY M. PLAIT, THB CHIlD SAVBRS TIlB INVENTION OF 
DBUNQUENCY 3 (1969) [hereinafter PLAIT, CHIlD SAVERS]. The Supreme Court accepted this 
conventional wisdom about the reformers in its review of the origin of the system in Gault. 
See Gault, 387 U.s. at 14-17. However, this view fails to recognize that the term delinquency 
is not descriptive of inherently "bad" human behavior. Rather, it is a term applied to certain 
types of unacceptable conduct. Thus, the reformers were arguably engaged in a "rule-making" 
process designed to establish the standards by which certain types of behavior by minors were 
judged to be deviate. See PLAIT, CHIlD SAVERS, supra at 7-9; Stanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice 
Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN L RBv. 1187, 1201 (1970) [hereinafter Fox, 
Juvenile Justice Reform]. Instead of being politically neutral, the movement was in fact motivat-
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There is a reason why the Gault decision included a historical 
review of the juvenile court system and the prevalent socio-cultural 
view of children. It was impossible to talk about the issue of the rights 
of juveniles without delineating the socio-historical context in which the 
question arose. One simply could not understand or analyze this ques-
tion without appreciating the assumptions underlying the parens patriae 
doctrine and the relationship among minors, the family and the 
state.llS Part of this socio-historical context necessarily includes the 
juvenile justice movement itself and its place in American society dur-
ing the early years of the twentieth century. When the Court uncrit-
ically accepted a particular view of the system's origin, it was explicit-
ly legitimating the assumptions of the reformers who created the sys-
tem. These reformers represented a break from the goals and style of 
other reform movements. It was not seen as a political movement, as 
other reforms had been in the past. Politics involved issues of govern-
ment while juvenile courts sought to redefine the quality and meaning 
of life experienced by minors.u6 Hence the notion that the courts 
were surrogate parents helping to shape and redefine the content and 
direction of an aberrant youth's life. Juveniles were seen as victims of 
ed by class and political interests. See generally PLAIT, CHIU> SAVERS, supra at 109. What 
superficially appeared to be rigbt, necessary and fair to cbildren was far more complicated than 
a recognition of undeniably bumane values and concern for tbe best interests of children. 
115. The need to asseSs tbe meaning of juvenile rights witbin tbe broader socio-cultural con-
text in which the dialogue occurs is an example of what Professor Tushnet calls "fundamental 
indeterminacy." See Mark Tushnet, An Essay On Rights, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1363, 1375 (1984) 
[hereinafter Tushnet, An Essay]. Tushnet argues that recognizing a right as implicated in a 
particular setting does not produce any determinate consequences. An abstract right, such as the 
liberty interest implicated by a curfew statute, is specified in particular social contexts. Recall, 
for example, the Atlanta ordinance and the various explanations as to its necessity and the 
different views on what it was designed to accomplish. See supra notes J-5 and accompanying 
text. The public discourse on whether a minor's rights were violated was inextricably tied to 
the social context in which the rights were exercised, i.e., the increased drug use in the cites, 
rising crime rates; and an increase in the number of drug-related homicides. This same type of 
approach is mirrored in the court's assessment of the rights - liberty interests - of parents 
and minors. See supra notes 37-56 and accompanying text. Any attempt to specify the rights of 
minors under the curfew statute or even under the broader parens palriae doctrine ultimately 
leads to a description of the social order that created the rights. See Tushnet, An Essay, supra 
at 1375-80. 
It is particularly difficult to avoid this broader discussion of the social context when 
examining the validity of curfew ordinances. A curfew violation is a status offense. An offen-
der's behavior violates preconceived notions of how children ought to behave and does not 
necessarily indicate the child is engaging in criminal or dangerous behavior. See supra note 34. 
Any discussion of the rigbts of minors raises tbe larger question of how one formulates a defi-
nition of appropriate behavior and whether that defmition must be altered to accommodate the 
widespread divergence of children's behavior from tbat definition. 
116. LAsCH, NEW RADICAUSM, supra note SO, at 90. 
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a social order that destroyed their families and lives.ll7 
Politics, however, were not removed from the reformers' agenda 
as much as it was being redefined. While the desire to tr~nsform how 
we should view aberrant youths may not be an inherently political act,_ 
it becomes political when the reformist impulse is transformed into a 
program for action implemented and enforced by the state.11S What 
began as a cultural issue - how some families vary from one another 
and may not perform or perform differ~ntly certain functions tradition-
ally associated with families - became a political issue. Politics and 
the law were explicitly utilized as the instruments for solutions to cul-
tural problems.ll9 From its inception, the system was premised upon a 
blurring of the line between the public welfare and the private interest 
of the family. Though recognized as two separate interests, they were 
thought of as mutually reinforcing so that state intervention in the 
family could occur without seriously damaging the identity of the fami-
ly as a private institution. The state was not an unwelcome intruder as 
much as it was a partner in the effort to preserve the efficacy and 
identity of a private and culturally significant sphere of activity. The 
state did not intend to destroy the walls separating the private from the 
public; it merely sought to, at most, reconstruct them or, at the very 
least, reinforce them. 
Alternatively, the line separating the private sphere of family the 
public interest could justifiably be, in the minds of some reformers, 
totally obliterated, and the integrity and identity of the family could re-
main intact. If one assumes, as some reformers did, that socio-cultural 
problems were generated by the existence of purely private interests, 
what wl!S needed were institutions that transcended private interests in 
the name of an indisputable public good.120 Reducing the hardships 
117. !d. at 150-57. 
118. See id. at 90; PLAn, CHIID SAVERS, supra note 114, at 10-12, 98-100. 
119. See LAsCH, NEW RADICAUSM, supra note SO, at 161-63. 
120. For the reformers, the question was whether individuals and institutions would step 
forward and personally intervene in the lives of children to help develop their character and 
improve the quality of their lives. The problem appeared to be a technical one of how institu-
tions and individuals could effectively alter some of the most intimate areas of a child's life. 
See PLAn, CHIID SAVERS, supra note 114, at 91-92. This was not seen as an exercise of 
political power, but rather as a matter of adjusting children to better cope with their circum-
stances. See LAsCH, NEW RADICAUSM, supra note SO, at 155-57. However, the conflict between 
public and private interests could not be so easily swept away. Children were reconciled with a 
system which the reformers acknowledged as victimizing. See id. at 157. Arguably, the reform-
ers were acting, perhaps unwittingly, on behalf of a public interest by attempting to channel 
reform in the direction of reconciliation rather than confrontation. It appears, though, that what 
consciously motivated those seeking change was a belief in a public interest of protecting 
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experienced by some minors was seen as an undeniable public good 
that would justify radical intervention and restructuring of a family 
without due regard to the potential impact on the private identity of the 
family. Thus, the family was subject to state intervention either in the 
name of preserving the family as a private sphere of activity which 
indirectly served a public interest, or in the name of restructuring the 
family so that it could better serve a transcendent public interest which 
ultimately served the interests of all in society. 
Given these assumptions and perspectives, Justice Fortas' opinion 
is somewhat less opaque. The Court, probably unwittingly, attempted to 
reconcile the conflict between the various strains of thought that existed 
in the juvenile justice reform movement. Minors were victimized by a 
social order that diminished the quality of their lives,121 but the solu-
tion was not to change the social order. Rather, the solution was to 
change the quality of their lives by redirecting and controlling their 
behavior. III This was deemed to be enrichment, not control, of their 
lives.l23 
There was, however, a double-edged sword operating here. No 
matter how much the movement was portrayed as improving the quality 
of the juvenile's life, there remained an irreducible element of social 
control inherent in the system. Despite the concern for the welfare of 
minors, the juvenile system allowed more control and intervention into 
the lives of minors and their families than traditional criminal law. By 
focusing on factors such as the quality of life and behavior indicative 
of future problems, the system justified intervention, often before there 
was overt behavior .124 
children from the ravages of the culture of capitalism. However, once the idea of the existence 
of a substantive public interest began to wane, i.e., a belief that there was a consensus on the 
need to protect children from capitalist evils, the tension caused by various competing private 
interests and the interpenetration of the public and the private interests came to the fore. See 
supra Horowitz, The History, note 71, at 1427. The juvenile court system no longer represented 
a system which transcended political debate by embodying a consensus on what was in the 
public interest. It became an institution, reflective of how the state sanctioned some competing 
interests and rejected others. See id. at 1427. See also text accompanying notes 121-123. 
121. See LAsCH, N~ RADICAUSM, supra note SO, at 154. 
122. ]d. at 155-57. 
123. ]d. at 163. 
124. This occurs because the juvenile system is based upon a deterministic view of criminal 
or antisocial behavior. A criminal is not born, but is a product of her environment. Thus crime 
does not represent individual failure or moral culpability and is better viewed as an inevitable 
and predictable response to certain social stimuli. See NICHOLAS N. KiTIRIp, THB RIGHT 10 DB 
DIFFERBrre DEVIANCB AND ENFORCBD THERAPY 39-41 (1974) [hereinafter KiTIRIp, 11IB RIGHT]. 
The juvenile justice system, therefore, focused upon the undesirability of one's condition. 
Intervention is justified because of one's status and what that status might lead to, as opposed 
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Gault then represents not a statement of principle, but an affirma-
tion of a cultural consensus on the assumptions underlying the juvenile 
justice system, i.e., the relationship among the family, minors and the 
state. The opinion is an example of what happens when the lines be-
tween culture, law and politics are not recognized as creating different 
spheres of human action. As a political movement with cultural goals, 
the juvenile justice reformers used the law as a mechanism for control-
ling certain minors and their families. l2S 
c. GAULT AND ITS CHALLENGE To LIBERALISM 
There is another aspect to Gault which raises issues that go to the 
very heart of liberalism as it has been defined in America. The Gault 
decision accepted the idea that state intervention is essential if the child 
is to succeed in life. A .child is always subject to some form of custo-
dyl26 and the state perceived itself as, doing no more than performing 
the parental functions of ascertaining the child's needs and providing 
the resources necessary "for the child to succeed in society.l21 This 
view of children and their behavior is rooted in a deterministic view of 
the relationship between family life and success in later life. The pa-
rens patriae doctrine focused on the minor's physical and social cir-
cumstances as the cause of socially undesirable behavior. Anti-social 
behavior is deemed to be a disease much like any other physical ail-
ment. Unlike a physical ailment, however, the cure requires the loss of 
privacy and the monitoring and manipulation of the child's environ-
ment. Sometimes intervention was necessary even before the child 
exhibited undesirable behavior.l28 
to what one has done. Traditional criminal law, however, held the individual responsible for her 
conduct and imposed sanctions based upon actual conduct rather than potential for future . 
antisocial behavior. /d. at 47-48, 390-91. 
125. One of the consequences of melding distinct areas of human activity into an undif-
ferentiated whole is that some of the more intimate areas of human activity are subject to 
political and legal control. Questions which were formerly the subject of debate and resolution 
in the arts and letters become political and legal issues. See LAsCH, NEW RADICAUSM, supra 
note SO, at 90. Moreover, this problem is compounded by the inability of the legal system to 
define the rights of minors or their families without reference to the entire social framework in 
which the issue arose. See supra note 115. The legal system simply will not provide any 
definitive moral authority for resolving issues concerning intimate areas of human activity. See 
generally Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra note 82. Thus, the search for a "legal standard" or 
"rights" to govern certain aspects of family life invariably collapses into an assessment of 
cultural values under the guise of a search for transcendent legal principles. Cultural issues are 
then discussed in legal terms rather than using other intellectual disciplines whose modes of 
analysis and discourse are not limited to legal reasoning. 
126. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984). D 
127. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 14-17. 
128. See supra note 124. There has been, however, a movement away from the determinis-
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When the Court adopted this detenninistic approach it committed 
itself to an escala~ing level of control over minors and their families. 
Gault attempted to limit the process by assessing the extent to which 
the state's actions were succeeding in changing the behavior of children 
after they were subjected to "treatment.,,129 It is this rising level of 
intervention which signals an ideological price to be paid for accepting 
this detenninistic approach. As Professor Fishkin notes, liberalism is 
concerned with how society rations the opportunities for people to 
achieve unequal levels of succesS.130 Inequality of results is not 
deemed to be unjust and is indeed accepted if there has been fair com-
petition131 for unequal positions in society. 
Fair competition, however, can only be maintained at a substantial 
cost to liberty. In this instance, the liberty sacrificed is the autonomy of 
tic approach to criminal behavior, generally, and juvenile delinquency, specificalIy. The con-
sensus that once supported the social and ideological bases for rehabilitation has eroded to the 
point where rehabilitation is no . longer viewed as a legitimate goal of the juvenile justice sys-
tem. See generally, FRANCES A. AlLEN, THE DBCUNE OF mE REHABIUTATIVE IDEAL (1981) 
[hereinafter AlLEN, THE DECUNE]. This loss of consensus, however, is only part of a larger 
process which has resulted in the loss of confidence in many institutions in society and a belief 
that individuals lack the ability to shape and control their lives. !d. at I. 
129. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying texts. However, the attempt to limit tbe 
intrusive nature of the process conflicts with the assumptions and ideology undergirding tbe pro-
cess. When the social control of children was linked to deterministic theories of deviate bebav-
ior, the responses to children were driven by the degree of faith accorded to tbe ability of 
social scientists to predict behavior and outcomes based upon present circumstances. See Barry 
C. Felli, The Transformation of The Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 694 (1991). The 
standard for intervention into the lives of juveniles and their families shifted from engaging in 
morally culpable conduct to effectiveness in circumventing future undesirable behavior. Guilt is 
associated with personal responsibility, while the latter standard is rooted in socio-scientific 
notions of causation and probability. See KiTIRIE, THE RIGHT, supra note 124, at 380-81. When 
effectiveness is the primary restraint on the system, traditional notions of what the state mayor 
may not do are subverted to scientific theories of what is or is not possible or predictable. See 
id. at 386-87. If children I.lnd human behavior are completely malIeable and state intervention is 
based upon the ability to mold behavior to serve social ends, the potential for unrestrained 
expansion of state power is patently clear. See generally AllEN, THE DECLINE, supra note 128, 
at 34-48. 
130. JAMES S. FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND mE FAMILY 1 (1983) [bereinaf-
ter FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNI1Y]. 
131. !d. at 5-6. Fishkin refers to the competitive process as "process equalities." These are 
"institutionalized practices designed to guarantee equal coDsideration of everyone's preferences or 
interests." !d. at 158. This concept is similar to what most Americans think of when they use 
the term fair competition. Competition for unequal positions is based upon merit, that is, the 
ability to meet qualifications relevant to job performance in the position to be filIed. The 
difficulty posed by this concept is that very often predictions about success in the competition 
can be made based upon factors other than the competitor's ability to meet the qualifications. 
Not everyone has enjoyed ~ess to the resources necessary to develop the abilities required for 
certain positions. Fair competition might require equalizing the developmental conditions for 
talent development. See id. at 5. 
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the family. This occurs because of the simple fact that not all familieS 
are equally alike in their structure, values and resources. Likewise, all 
children are not the same and do not have the same socio-economic 
advantages and disadvantages. In the competition .for achievement of 
one's preferences, those with privileged or advantaged backgrounds are 
more likely to succeed than not. Any attempt to assist children from 
less advantaged backgrounds would necessarily require a restructuring 
of their family environment in ways that will lead to success in the 
competition for unequal positions.132 This type of intervention is at 
odds with family autonomy, but it does reduce the negative aspects of 
diversity in family structure and values. Uniformity is necessary be-
cause diversity has the undesirable effect of producing minors with 
different developmental influences that mayor may not be adventitious 
in the competition for unequal positions.133 
At a superficial level, Gault appears to be consistent with 
liberalism's requirement of fair competition, and arguably sought to 
equalize the life chances of wayward youths. The procedural rights 
granted to minors would seemingly increase the autonomy of juveniles 
by enhancing their ability to demonstrate the inappropriateness of the 
state's actions. Procedural safeguards would, therefore, indirectly reduce 
the amount or level of intervention into the lives of juveniles and their 
families. But, the apparent compatibility of Gault and family autonomy 
is specious. Remember, the Court did not reject the assumptions under-
lying the system, it merely acknowledged that the system was not 
working as well as originally conceived. In fact, the Court carefully 
noted how its ruling would not compel the states to alter or abandon 
the original motivation in implementing the system.134 Thus, procedur-
al safeguards made intervention more effective by limiting intervention 
only to those minors in need of reform, but did not necessarily reduce 
the level of the intervention nor undermine the state's rationale in sup-
port of its intrusion. 
Gault represents the acceptance of a system which at times is 
willing to sacrifice family autonomy, i.e., liberty, in the" name of pro-
viding troubled minors with equal opportunity.Bs A corollary to this 
proposition is that increasing the number of rights or safeguards in the 
system could increase the autonomy of families and result in the dimi-
nution of the minor's ability to successfully compete in society. The 
132. See id. at 3-10. 
133. /d. at 67-68. 
134. 387 U.S. at 21-26. 
135. See FISHKIN, JUSTICE, EQUAL QpPOR11JNI1Y, supra note 130, at 64-67. 
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Court's awareness of this proposition is evident in its mindful assess-
ment of the extent.to which an increase in the rights available to juve-
niles will affect the ability of the juvenile courts to accomplish its 
mission.136 
Whether one looks to the Gault decision or the Report of the 
National Commission On Children, the same theme prevails. There is 
either an explicit or implicit recognition that the relationship between 
the family and society is, at best, an uneasy one. Yet, we still wish to 
maintain the imagery of the family as an autonomous institution, deeply 
rooted in our cultural tradition, and for the most part, beyond state 
control. While using the language and imagery of autonomy, families 
and specifically children are subject to extensive control. By searching 
for specific rights which minors should have, our attention is directed 
towards a specific issue. In reality, however, the issue is subsumed by 
the larger question of the extent to which rights and the family/state 
relationship reflect a process of politics and socio-cultural change. 
The conception of the family as a private entity performing so-
cially useful and, to a certain extent, public functions, obfuscates what 
is in fact the shifting nature of the political decision-making process 
spurred into action by socio-cultural changes in society. Instead of 
separating law from politics,137 the view of the family and minors as 
existing in a private not public realm serves to obscure the intercon-
nectedness of families, society, politics and the law.138 Casting the 
relationship between these institutions as one involving rights does little 
to lessen the confusion. Gault is a prime example of how rights cannot 
be understood without reference to the social order in which the rights 
are analyzed or defined.139 Justice Fortas found it necessary to re-
count the history of the juvenile justice system because the rights of 
minors in the system had no meaning in the abstract. Only within the 
context of the juvenile justice movement, with its goals and role in 
136. See cases cited supra note 113. 
137. See Horowitz, The History, supra note 120, at 1425 (showing how the private and 
public law distinction maintained by nineteenth century jurists was an attempt to sharply sepa-
rate law from politics by creating a neutral and apolitical system of legal doctrine and legal 
reasoning free of what was thought to be the dangerous tendencies of democratic politics). 
138. ·The real power of this view lies in its ability to convince people not so much that 
this is the right way to conceive of the world, as much as it is "the only attainable world in 
which a sane person would want to live." Gordon, Critical Histories, supra note 81, at 109. 
See also Karl E. Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L REv. 
1358, 1417 (1982) (private spheres of life are linked to and partially constituted by law and 
politics, and the primary effect of conceiving of them as in different realms is to inhibit our 
ability to see social institutions as the product of human design and subject to change). 
139. See supra- note 115 and accompanying text. 
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society at large, wa,s it possible to determine what rights were due 
minors. 
D. THE CHIlDREN'S RIGHI'S MOVEMENT 
The previous sections demonstrate the extent to which the issues 
raised by curfew ordinances reflect broader cultural and political issues 
left unr~olved and not fully understoqd. The courts, however, will 
continue to resolve the "rights of minors issue" in narrow legal terms. 
If this is to prevail as the mode of analysis, what are the consequences 
of casting a socio-cultural issue in legal terms? Any attempt to answer 
this question must begin with an understanding of the effect of granting 
"rights" to minors had upon how society perceived minors. 
The juvenile justice movement was unique in defining cultural 
issues in political terms and vice versa.140 Gault did not question this 
approach and enshrined it in juvenile justice jurisprudence. The Su-
preme Court accepted the problem solving methodology inherent in the 
juvenile courts and sought to cast subsequent issues as involving the 
expansion or contraction of rights ext~nded to minors. Thereafter, the 
manifestations of cultural change and diversity apparent in families and 
society were camouflaged by the legal rhetoric of rights. That is, chil-
dren have been increasingly viewed as autonomous individuals with 
rights, not as responsibilities we all share - as family members and 
members of society. Just as the advocates for a separate juvenile justice 
system responded to perceived problems in families and the urban 
environment, so too the latter day advocates of children's rights at-
tempted, in part, to address socio-cultural issues through legal 
mechanisms. As with the juvenile justice movement, the children's 
rights movement came with "historical baggage" and assumptions that 
remained unexamined. 
The children's rights movement grew out of the larger civil rights 
movement of the 1950s and 60S.141 The mot~vating force was not 
necessarily the belief that children were damaged by the traditional 
common law doctrines governing family relationships. Rather, the com-
mitment to egalitarian principles equated constraints with a diminution 
140. See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying texts. 
141. See Hafen, Individualism amI Autonomy, supra note SO, at 4-7; Bruce L. Hafen, 
Children's Liberation amI the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservation About Abandoning Youth 
to Their Rights, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 630-32 (1976) [hereinafter Hafen, Children's Lib-
eration]; Gary A. Debele, The Due Process Revolution and the Juvenile Court: The Matter of 
Race in the Historical Evolution of a Doctrine, 5 LAw & INEQ. J. 513 (1987). 
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of individual liberty.142 One consequence of this belief was the prolif-
eration of discrete interests in the family. There was no longer a dis-
tinct and paramount corporate family interest, such as raising and nur-
turing the next.generation. Instead, the family existed as an assemblage 
of individuals with similar,' though not necessarily identical, inter-
ests.143 This pluralist view of the family raised the prospect that the 
autonomy of children required a certain measure of being "left 
alone. ,,144 Children need this freedom to pursue their own lives and 
interests. Individual autonomy was the paramount value basel;! upon the 
assumption that human beings have the capacity to shape their 
lives.14S 
Children came to be viewed as similar to blacks who were strug-
gling for integration into mainstream American life. In effect, children 
were a newly-discovered "minority" who stood outside of mainstream 
society because they were deprived of rights exercised by adults. The 
association asserted between the nonacceptance of blacks and the need 
to "free" children is significant. Constraints on liberty, from the inte-
grationist perspective, are associated with irrational behavior. That is, 
children may be different from adults but there is a large area of com-
mon ground which eliminates any rational reason for imposing addition-
al constraints upon children. That these constraints are imposed is evi-
dence of obscured reason and not necessarily any satisfaction of a 
special need of children.l46 
142. See Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy, supra note 80, at 4-5. 
143. See Note, Developments, supra note 75, at 1160 (concluding that the constitutional lim-
its on family law have a-eated a family consisting of a collection of intimately related individu-
als who possess distinct and not necessarily harmonious individual rights, rather than an organic 
unit possessing intrinsic group rights applicable in all contexts). 
144. This view is similar to the distinction drawn between negative and positive freedom. 
See ISAIAH BERUN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LWERTY 121-22 (1970) [hereinafter BERUN, FOUR 
EsSAYS]. Berlin distinguishes between what he calls negative and positive liberty. Negative 
liberty refers to those areas of a person's life in which she is left to do what she chooses to 
do without interference. In other words, one is free to act unobstructed by others or the state. 
This contrasts with positive liberty which focuses upon self-realization through self-direction. Id. 
at 131. 
145. See Richards, The Individual, supra note 77, at 8-11. 
146. See Gary Pellar, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE W. 758, 768-89 (1990) [hereinafter 
Pellar, Race). The argument here is not that children in America are in the same position that 
Blacks occupied prior to or during the civil rights movement. Nor is it argued that somehow 
the civil rights movement caused the children's rights movement. The point is that beliefs about 
the position of children were associated with the same perspective that assessed the plight of 
blacks in America. The law helped shape and limit the extent to which the position of children 
could be viewed from a perspective other than the liberal integrationist point of view. See 
Gordon, Critical, supra note 81, at 111 (''In short, the legal forms We use set limits on what 
we can imagine as practical options: Our desires and plans tend to be shaped out of a limited 
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This view of children as victims of irrational discrimination fits 
very easily into the prevailing liberal notion of the right of every indi-
vidual to be judged according to her individual merit rather than her 
status or group membership. The domination experienced by children 
was akin to that experienced by blacks because of their race. Integra-
tion, with its emphasis upon rationality, neutrality and individual free-
dom was a powerful weapon in the struggle to free children from irra-
tional constraints.147 And, the liberation of children from archaic 
forms of constraint may be considered as part of the larger process of 
social progress toward a more enlightened relationship between children 
and society.l48 Any commitment to understanding and assessing the 
needs of children based upon their own peculiar experiences in society 
and the family was simply backwards, irrational and worst of all, unsci-
entific.149 
Thus, the end product of the liberation effort was a change in 
perspective about children. They are now free to be people who, in 
stock of forms available to us: The forms thus condition not just our power to get what we 
want but what we want or think we can get itselr). 
147. See Pellar, Race, supra note 146, at 772-73. 
148. The extent to which legal and political issues are enmeshed in cultural images was 
articulated by Professor Pellar and applies with equal force to children. The aims of racial 
integration seem self-evident because they are one part of a web of meaning that constitutes the 
dominant ideology of the nature of social progress itself. The meaning of race has been grafted 
onto other central cultural images of progress, so that the transition from segregation to integra-
tion and from race consciousness to race neutrality mirrors movements from myth to enlighten-
ment, from ignorance to knowledge, from superstition to reason, from the primitive to the civi-
lized, from religion to secularism, and, most importantly, the historical self-understanding of 
liberal society as representing the movement from status to individual liberty. In other words, 
integrationist ideology comprehends the issue of racial domination by viewing race relations 
through stock images about the nature of progress in liberal society and through the prism of a 
qualitative difference between liberal enlightenment and feudal hierarchy. See Pellar, Race, supra 
note 146, at 774. 
149. This was the argument raised against black nationalists who rejected the universalist 
ideology of integration. Integrationists ignored the unique identity of blacks forged by their 
experiences throughout American history. For nationalists, race and racial identity were social 
creations whose meaning required an examination of history and social institutions. See Pellar, 
Race, supra note 146, at 791-94. The same can be said of the meaning of childhood. Child-
hood is a social construct whose meaning varies over time and according to the perspective 
from which it is viewed - from that of a child or an adult. See VALERIE SURANSKY, THE 
EROSION OF CHILDHOOD 28-32 (1982); Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy, supra note SO, at 
30-34. Both the nationalists and those who seek to define and understand childhood from the 
perspective of a child are focusing upon something which may be more akin to .what Berlin 
defines as the desire for recognition. Berlin notes that liberty is often confused with the. demand 
for recognition. Whether in its negative or positive form, liberty involves defending oneself 
against the authority of others. However, recognition involves a desire for "union, closer under- • 
standing, integration of interests, a life of common dependence and common sacrifice." BERUN, 
FOUR EsSAYS, supra note 144, at 158. 
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large measure, are deemed to be no different than adults. With rights as 
the motivational force behind the liberation, children became individu-
als, not charges. 
CONCLUSION 
Many of the forces that helped define the meaning and structure 
of families and their relationship to society were not impersonal social 
forces, but represented, in part, the product of state intervention and 
deliberate social engineering. What we are left with is a rather curious 
combination of influences, all of which can be identified in the Su-
preme Court's efforts to shape the rights of minors in the juvenile 
justice system. Families are institutions recreated by generations of hu-
mans over time and within this recreative process there is always the 
possibility that individuals will redefine and change what it means to 
be a minor and family member in America. This dual nature of the 
family - the ability to promote stability and change - is tacitly ac-
knowledged in the reverential terms used by the Supreme Court when 
it pays homage to the family and its pivotal role in society. It is a 
preeminently private institution beyond the control of the state, yet 
because of its important role it cannot be fully trusted to make the 
right decisions. It is therefore subject to monitoring by the state in the 
name of protecting the family from itself and the state from family 
decisions. And this view of the family is not limited to the Supreme 
Court, as evidenced by the Commission's Principles for Action. 1\vo 
different bodies - one political, the other judicial - are using the 
same rhetoric in attempting to define the meaning of family in Ameri-
ca. 
It is· the tension created by the dual nature of the family that 
ultimately lies behind the curfew statutes and the broader question of 
the degree to which a minor's constitutional rights differ from those of 
an adult. The short-hand term for this tension has come to be called 
"family values." What exactly does this term mean? No one can say 
for certain! It only has one hundred definitions - if you limit the 
questioning to one hundred people. One thing is certain, though. Re-
gardless of the definition offered, each person is likely to identify him-
self as possessing and/or practicing the enumerated value, as opposed to 
others who fail to recognize the value. A family value is not necessari-
ly a descriptive term with a substantive meaning. It is more an attempt 
to defme the bourtdaries that identify certain families as being "real" 
and "traditional" and therefore "natural," "private" and beyond the 
reach of state regulation. 
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This type of response is not new and ultimately he~ped to spawn 
the juvenile justice system with its view of what a family ought to be 
and how minors ought to behave. Equally as clear is that the Supreme 
Court's conception of what a family is and the values it promotes will 
serve as the force behind any decision the Court may render on the 
constitutionality of juvenile curfew ordinances. Perhaps a better way of 
viewing the issue is that there is not and never has been a shortage of 
values; the question is whose values shall prevail and how will this 
cultural phenomenon translate into political and legal power. 
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